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The purpose of this study is to explore systems users’ behavior on IS under the various 
circumstances (e.g., email usage and malware threats, online communication at the individual 
level, and IS usage in organizations). Specifically, the first essay develops a method for 
analyzing and predicting the impact category of malicious code, particularly email worms. The 
current study creates two frameworks classifying email worms based on their detrimental impact. 
The first is the Total Life Impact (TLI) framework, a classifier to categorize worms in terms of 
their impact. The other is the Short Term Impact (STI) framework which allows for prediction of 
the impact of the worm utilizing the data available during the early stages in the life of a worm. 
Given the classification, this study identifies how well the STI framework allows for prediction 
of the worm into its final impact category. 
The second essay aims to examine the effects of both spam and the resulting lack of 
privacy on users' behavior with respect to e-mail usage. This study reveals that spam e-mail 
triggers users’ privacy concerns and, in turn, such concerns influence the way that the users cope 
with spam or junk mails. Upon receiving spam e-mail, the users predominantly exhibit two 
different behavioral patterns: usage-oriented (passive) and protection-oriented (proactive) 
behavior.  
The third essay examines the impact of perceived information assurance, risk, and 
resilience on IS effectiveness in the context of extreme events. Resilience in organizations is the 
positive capacity to cope with negative extreme events. Also, this is critical to ensuring business 
continuity. While the subject of resilience has been investigated from an engineering perspective, 
from an IS context, it remains an understudied area. The present study develops a model that is 
tested with data collected from three of the hospitals in Western New York that were affected by 




Consistent with development of information systems and technology, security and 
privacy issues have been widely considered to be explained for effective and secure usage of 
information systems (IS) and technology (IT) in the various circumstances. The endless war 
between privacy threats and security in the IS/IT areas has had systems users recognize system 
vulnerability for individual and organizational purposes in using IS/IT. The users’ such 
perception on privacy may affect their usage performance in individual or organizational 
contexts.  
In this situation, an important overarching issue arises: Whether does information 
assurance have various impacts on individual behaviors and organizational performance under 
various IS/IT contexts? This in turn leads to the questions of what roles information security and 
privacy acts in the relationship between IS and systems users and how the users psychologically 
deal with the factors affecting their systems usage behaviors. In order to answer the questions, 
this dissertation, consisting of three essays, focuses on a technical/psychological way to 
investigate malware and end-user behavior in the context of individual and organizations. These 
essays shed light on our understanding on human behaviors and their underlying psychological 
mechanisms in various circumstances focusing on information assurance. 
This study is overall to explore systems users’ behavior on information systems and 
explain phenomenon occurring under the various circumstances, such as email usage and 
malware threats, online communication in individual level, and IS usage in organizations, related 
to security and privacy issues both technically and psychologically.  
This study attempts first to find the effect of email worms on systems and develop a 
frame to classify email worms based on detrimental impacts of different types of worms. This 
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study develops two frameworks and compares these two frameworks to categorize those worms. 
This study show that the there would be categorized with different method from antivirus 
companies suggests. Second study examines the effects of spam on users’ protecting behaviors 
and how privacy concerns affect users’ behavior with respect to email usage. This study explains 
how users’ protecting behaviors come out. This essay explains email users’ protecting behaviors 
are triggered by spam experience but privacy concerns mediate the effect of spam experience on 
users’ behaviors. Therefore, readers can identify that their protecting behaviors arise from not 
just spam experience but also their privacy concerns. 
Third study investigates mediating effect of information security for perceived risk along 
with organizational resilience in organizations’ information systems under the disaster context 
and its consequence on the usage of the information systems.  Used information systems success 
theory as theoretical framework, this study finds the relationship between critical factors and 
information systems on integrated model explaining the organizational systems effectiveness. 
This third study deals with important issues which have been regarded as critical elements in IS 
research. Theoretically, this study uses psychological process that risk perception affects 
information system via information assurance and organizational resilience. Methodologically, in 
order to find the impact of extreme events, this study used multigroup analysis by comparing two 
contexts: pre- and post-event under the quasi-field experiment design with survey questions.  The 
integrated goal of all there essays is to enhance our understanding about human behavior and 





Essay1: Short Term and Total Life Impact Analysis of Email 
Worms in Computer Systems 
 
1. Introduction 
Worms, avatars of malicious code, are self-replicating programs that have often almost 
succeeded in bringing down the whole Internet system.1 Worms such as SoBig.f and MyDoom, 
have caused tremendous loss of productivity, time and sales  resulting in costs upwards of $1 
billion and $250 million, respectively as a result of the tremendous loss of productivity, time and 
sales (Salkever, 2003; Stein, January 30, 2004). Beyond the major damages stated above, email 
worms also have influences on intangible assets of companies, such as their prestige and 
customer loyalty. 
The economic damage driven by Internet worms is part of recorded history, once the 
effective life of the worm is over and the worm has run its course (Sharman, Krishna, Rao, & 
Upadhyaya, 2006). However, if the effect of the worm could be predicted during the early stages 
of its life, a more effective and rapid response can be developed. Predicting the impact of the 
worm in its early stages is beneficial for economic reasons. For example, insurance companies 
that specialize in cyber policies are interested in knowing the impact of a worm in order to 
process claims and to determine the payout time based on the expected impact. Payouts on 
insurance claims for damages are usually made when the extent of the damage has been fully 
assessed. Further being able to predict the impact of the worm based on early data can become a 
guiding yardstick in the planning of and monitoring of the application of patches. 




 Although email has become an indispensable communication medium in our life, worms 
can be almost impossible to eliminate until long after the targets are removed from the internet 
(Nazario, Anderson, Wash, & Connelly, 2001). For this reason, email worms are increasingly 
attacking systems with intensity and using more advanced social engineering tricks (C. C. Zou, 
Oct. 2004). System managers and security officers can decide whether immediate disruption of 
the business is justifiable based on the potency of the worm in terms of its risk or detrimental 
impact, such as loss of productivity, lost data, denial of systems, systems crashes and so on. A 
low impact and low risk worm can perhaps be handled on a bi-weekly or weekly basis as a part 
of the regular maintenance routine. According to ICSA Labs (ICSA, 2004), 92% of all worms 
enter the enterprise via email so studying impact of e-mail worms is important. Thus, it is crucial 
to categorize email worms based on their impact. By doing so, companies would be able to take 
relevant actions with the predicted information on the potential damages of worms. 
There are two main contributions of this paper. First, the current paper develops a 
descriptive model to categorize email worms based on their impact by using two frameworks, the 
Total Life Impact (TLI) and Short Term Impact (STI).    The Total Life Impact (TLI) Framework 
is a descriptive model or classifier to categorize worms in terms of their impact, after the worm 
has run its course. Therefore in a sense the TLI provides a standard reflecting ground truth. The 
second framework, the Short Term Impact (STI) framework, allows for prediction of the impact 
of the worm utilizing the data available during the early stages in the life of a worm. These two 
frameworks help us classify and compare the life of each worm, as well as allow us to determine 
whether early hit number of worms can represent the total life of their hit and the accuracy of the 
representation. 
 Second, the present study develops factors, such as total hit number and hit density to 
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characterize the impact of e-mail worms. The paper also develops an adaptation of the concept of 
group similarity index (GSI) to provide insights into the issue of categorization of email worms.  
We believe that the frameworks established in this paper can be utilized to enable 
insurers to make insurance payoffs as well as IT managers to cope with worm damage as early as 
possible. This is clearly an important need - to provide a way to do early triage of malware that 
will assist organizations in allocating resources for response. 
In exploring these issues, this paper furthers the understanding of the impact of email 
worms. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a general introduction and 
background information about worms. The methods of measuring impacts of worms are 
developed in Section 3. Included in the section are the definitions for factors and descriptions of 
terms related to the two frameworks, and a detailed technical discussion of these frameworks. 
Section 4 is devoted to data collection.  Independence tests for each factor are presented in 
Section 5.  Section 6 provides a comparison with two frameworks first using two dimensions and 
then using three dimensions. Validity and reliability tests with group similarity index (GSI) are 
presented in Section 7 along with the results. Finally in Section 8, forms the conclusion where 
we discuss the implications of this research on practice as well as limitations of the work.   
2. Background 
A question often asked is: how vulnerable are the processes, data and systems? To 
answer such questions we need to have a yardstick for measurement. The presumption here is 
that “if something can’t be measured, it can’t be managed” (Craft, 2000). While some 
researchers have started to focus on metrics for vulnerability assessment, there is a lacunae of 
research for evaluating, classifying, or categorizing damage by worms (Nazario, et al., 2001).  
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In order to provide a more complete background we provide a brief introduction to 
worms. The worm is characterized by its activity and independence (Qing & Wen, 2005; 
Zalewski, 2003) as compared to a virus, which adds itself to other programs, including operating 
systems. A worm is defined as a piece of malicious code that propagates over a network without 
human assistance. It can initiate attack independently with the need for the execution of specific 
programs (D.M. Kienzle & M.C. Elder, 2003)  based on malicious code, network propagation, 
human intervention, and standalone or file-infecting. Worms are grouped into three categories 
according to their propagation strategies (Qing & Wen, 2005): windows file-sharing worms, 
traditional worms and e-mail worms. Windows file sharing worms place a copy of themselves in 
a shared folder under a harmless name2 and subsequently take on a more malicious role  (Darrell 
M. Kienzle & Matthew C. Elder, 2003). Such worms take advantage of operating systems 
including Microsoft Windows peer-to-peer service. Traditional worms “attack across the Internet 
using direct connections over TCP/IP-based protocols, exploit vulnerabilities in operating 
systems and applications, typically do not require user intervention, and use other propagation 
vectors besides e-mail and Windows file sharing” (Darrell M. Kienzle & Matthew C. Elder, 
2003). 
In contrast to these two worms, email worms are malicious codes that propagate through 
email. According to Zou et al (C. C. Zou, Oct. 2004)  a worm can compromise a user’s computer 
and then find all email addresses stored on the  computer to send out worm email, when an email 
user opens a worm program in the attachments of a worm email. Email worms are currently the 
most common malware type in the world (Hypponen, 2004). 




Weaver and Paxon (Weaver & Paxson, 2004) have attempted to assess the damage 
caused by worms to provide a handle on the spending for defense against worms. They combine 
their estimate of the worst-case worm with a linear damage model, based on lost productivity, 
repair time, lost data, and damage to systems.  
Typically, anti virus companies use three broad attributes to categorize Malware3: wild 
(or wildness), damage (destructiveness), and distribution (or pervasiveness) (e.g. CA, Zonelabs, 
Symantec). According to Symantec.com4, category “wild” refers to the extent to which a virus 
has already spread among computer users. Category “damage” means the amount of damage that 
a given infection could inflict. “Distribution” is concerned with the matter of how quickly a 
program spreads itself. Symantec’s method divides malware into five severity threat categories 
from “very low” to “very severe.” This categorization is based on the current assessment of a 
malicious code’s severity where severity of malware changes as time goes on. Severity can be 
changed by filtering, cleaning (Zou, Gong, & Towsley, 2002). However, the different attributes 
are considered independently and are not grounded statistically. The next section identifies a new 
metric for classifying worms to determine the impact category of the worm during the course of 
its life, based on its behavior in its early stage. Our results suggest that this new measurement 
would serve to classify worms distinctly into several groups.  
3. Technique of Measuring Impact of Worms 
Sobig, deemed in 2003 as one of the worst e-mail worms ever, sent over 300 million 
                                                 
3 "Malware" is short for malicious software and is typically used as a catch-all term to refer to any 
software designed to cause damage to a single computer, server, or computer network, whether it's a virus, 




infected e-mail messages around the world5 resulting in unexpected detrimental impact 
worldwide. As it began spreading through internet, email delivery was delayed by several days, 
in some cases by weeks. Companies today rely on email to deliver business critical information 
and the financial implications are serious. This episode served as a warning shot, signaling the 
importance of e-mail as a communications channel and the vulnerability of our IT-dependant 
infrastructure. 
 ‘SoBig.f’ and ‘MyDoom’ had peak infection dates in the first month after their release. 
According to Messagelabs, the proportion of the first month infection to total infection for both 
worms was up to 87.6% and 89.25% respectively. In other words, ‘SoBig.f’ and ‘MyDoom’ 
worms had an early peak infection date and most infections occurred at the beginning stage of 
their life. W 32 / Yaha.P @mm peaked in terms of the number of hits after about 25 days after 
release (See Figure 2). From these cases, it is clear that it is important to consider the rapidity of 
spread for the first month as a crucial factor for evaluating the impact of worms on organizations.  
Clearly, the rapidity of spread and the amount of infections increase the probability of an 
organization being attacked by worms. A worm’s damage potency may also have a crucial 
impact on an organization.  Hence detrimental impact should not only include the damage 
potency of worms but also rapidity of spread and the amounts of infections. 
We base the framework development on three fundamental assumptions. The first 
assumption is that given two active worms with the same type of payload, the worm which has 
more numbers of hits in the same period has a greater detrimental impact. Second, we assume 
                                                 





that when the time for peak number of hits of a particular worm is earlier than for other worms, 
that worm has more severe detrimental impact. This second assumption is completely consistent 
with the first assumption. The reasoning here is that because there is a time lag for organizations 
to get defenses into place, the early strikers are likely to create more harm than late strikers. 
(Note this assumption does not always hold, but this is a general statement based on anecdotal 
information with Symantec executives and has been seen to often hold true).  Further, although 
some worms contain code to stop propagating after a certain date, we focus on worms with one 
year of more life. Our framework also assumes that a worm can be active for a period greater 
than a month. Incidentally the data on the 93 worms that we have used in this analysis have 
activity periods that span more than a month. It is important to point out that the STI framework 
(to be introduced in Sec. 3.1) is able to provide guidance based on a week’s worth of data. It can 
also be used with three to four days of data with a lower accuracy level.  
3.1 The Classification Process 
In this subsection we outline the classification process which consists of 4 steps as shown 
in Figure 1. In the first step, we developed two frameworks: one framework which serves to 
predict the impact of the  using early data and the second framework (considered ground truth) 
which uses all of the data after the worm has run its course (we consider this to be a year and a 




Figure 1. The Classification Process 
 In the second step, chi-square and correlation analysis are conducted to check 
independence between dimensions of each framework, and relationship between two frameworks. 
In third step, we try to find the “goodness” of match, for exploring how the framework can be 
used to predict the real severity, by comparing two frameworks. In step four we check validity 
and reliability of the frameworks using the group similarity index (GSI)  
3.2 The Frameworks for Measuring the Impact of Worms 
In this sub-section, we describe the development of two new frameworks, namely, the 
Total Life Impact (TLI) and Short Term Impact (STI) frameworks as a first step.  
The TLI framework provides a comparison standard as it relates to data after the worm 
has run its course. The STI framework provides a classification based on data available during 
the early stages in the life of a worm.  
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3.2.1 The Dimensions of Total Life Impact (TLI) Framework  
Framework TLI uses three dimensions for classification: Total Hit Number (LTH) - the 
logarithm of the cumulative number of hits over the entire lifespan, Hit density ( vHT ), and 
Damage Potency (DP). We now describe each of these dimensions. 
• Total hit number (LTH) 
In this study, ‘total hit number’ is defined as the total number of hits, or total number of 
machines infected by the worm, (as determined Messagelabs and Symantec) for the life of the 
worm. Hit number is captured by the frequency of emails which contained worms, stopped after 
the outbreak, by Message Labs6 (www.messagelabs.com). For the purposes of this study, we 
utilize the log of total hit number (LTH) as one of the dimensions. 
• Hit density ( HT ) 
To measure hit density for the first month, we adapt the concept of  ‘Hit Density’ from  
(Kim, Sivasailam, & Rao, 2004, 2005) and  ‘Density Index’ (Kim, Song, Baynov, & Rao, 2005). 
For our purpose we define, Hit density refers to the ratio of the hit number of a worm for the first 
month to the total hit number during its lifespan. This indicates the extent to which first month 
hits have an impact on the total impact in terms of the total hit number during worms’ lifespan. 
For example, the hit density of ‘JS/Flea.A’ worm, which accumulated 2340 hits in the first 
month out of 3213 (total hits), is 0.72. This value suggests the relative ratio of occurrence of the 
total hits. (Refer to Figure 2 which shows a plot of hit number versus time in days for the 
‘JS/Flea.A’ and ‘w32/Yaha.P@mm’ worms). Although most worms show a distinct lifespan that 
                                                 
6 Message labs had installed servers on the internet to collect the data we are using. 
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is different from the first month, they fall into the following characteristics with regard to Hit 
Density:  
 The typical range is  0 HT 1< ≤  
• Damage potency (DP) 
Damage potency (DP) measures the intrinsic attributes of a worm to cause detrimental 
impact. Damage potency captures the impact of payload and the rapidity of spread. It is also 
known as “Virulence” which means the degree of spread rapidity of worms that affect resources 
such as network bandwidth, router CPU/memory, or email server availability (Todd, 2003). The 
damage potency reflects the magnitude of the damage, which can potentially occur, resulting 
from an infection. A worm's damage potency may be rated high, medium, or low based on its 
inherent capacity to cause both direct and indirect damage to systems or networks. Certain 
worms are designed specifically to delete or corrupt files, causing direct damage. 
Trendmicro.com7, classifies damage potency into three categories as worm in Table 1.   
Table 1: Damage Potency Rating  
LEVEL CONTENTS EXAMPLES 
High 
(Unforeseeable 
& Very Serious 
Damage)* 
 System becomes unusable  
 System data or files are unrecoverable  
 System cannot be automatically recovered using tools 
 Recovery requires restoring from backup 
 Causes large amounts of network traffic  
 Data/files are compromised and sent to a third party  
Flash bios, format HDD 
Encryption of data 
Packet flooders, mass-mailers 
Backdoor capabilities 
(Silent manipulation of data, Re
distribution of confidential data 
to third parties.)** 
                                                 






 System/files can be recovered using Trend Micro prod
ucts or cleaning tools 
 Minor data/file modification  
 Malware that write minimal amount of data to the disk 
 Malware that kill applications in memory 
 Causes medium amount of network traffic  
 Automatically executes unknown programs 




(Deletion of single files, machin
e temporarily not available. & 
Deletion of many files, formatti
ng of hard drives, deletion of Fl
ash BIOS, . . .) 
Low 
(Little Damage) 
 No system changes  
 Deletion of less significant files in the system 
 Changes can be recovered by users without using any t
ools 
 Damage can be reversed just by restarting the system 
File  deletion 
(Output of text or sound.) 
*Damage from McAfee.com; ** examples from McAfee.com 
Damage potency may result from the payload carried by attack vectors (Lininger & Vines, 
2005) i.e. a path or means that a hacker can use to gain access to a computer or network server to 
deliver a payload or malicious codes8. The damages due to the payload are classified in to five 
types9 by McAfee (a major anti-virus vendor). The first type referred to as, Unforeseeable 
Damage has the most harmful impact on the systems. This type includes activities like 
redistributing confidential data to third parties or destroying an entire network. The second type 
known as Very Serious Damage includes activities, such as manipulating data silently. Serious 
Damage is the third type. Its payload includes activities such as deleting files, formatting hard 
drives, and deleting Flash BIOS. The fourth type is Medium Damage.  Deleting individual files 
and rendering the computer temporarily unavailable are the main activities for the type Medium 
Damage. Finally, the fifth type of payload, Little Damage includes activities such as generating 
bogus text or sounds and is the least virulent.  
                                                 
8 http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,290660,sid14_gci1005812,00.html 
9 Source: http://us.mcafee.com/VirusInfo/VIL/risk_assessment.asp 
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It is important to note that damage potency reflects the ability to cause damage and not 
the actual damages. This is because the actual damage can differ from firm to firm based on 
quality and speed of response in patch and or anti-virus deployment. In order to measure the 
magnitude of worms’ damage potency, we use the scale from McAfee and Computer 
Associates10. For the purposes of this analysis, the scale was converted to a scale where “high” 
ranged from 3 to 5 point and “low” ranged from 0 to 2 points in the scale.  
3.2.2 The Dimensions of Short Term Impact (STI) Framework  
STI framework is a classification based on the data available during the early stages in 
the life of a worm. STI framework also has three dimensions: the first dimension captures how 
early the worm has peaked and is a variant of the concept of skewness; the second dimension is 
the logarithmic measure of the number of hits in the time period from the release date up to the 
measurement day (three days, 1st week, 2nd week, 3rd week, and 1st month); and the third 
dimension is Damage Potency (DP). Both the TLI and STI frameworks use this dimension.  
The STI framework can be used at any time for example a few days after the release of 
the worm, a week later, etc. However, for illustrative purposes in this section we describe the STI 
framework using the first month of data, with no loss of generality. The remainder of this section 
is devoted to describing the dimensions of this third framework.  
ICSA Labs11 reported that the rapidity of spread is the primary cause for managerial costs 
driven by worms (ICSA, 2003). To minimize damage arising from rapid spread, organizations 
often deploy defensive measures within a few hours of the release of worms. Worms vary 
                                                 




considerably in terms of their diffusion rate. For example, macro worms, such as Melissa, take at 
least a few days to diffuse, whereas Code Red took about 12 hours to diffuse. These examples 
indicate that it is crucial to focus on analyzing information about worms within the early days 
after worm outbreaks. 
• Tskewness (TSKI) 
We adapt the term, ‘Tskewness’, from statistics as a way to identify the impact of a worm 
regarding time. Statistically, skewness refers to the degree of asymmetry of a distribution, or 
more precisely, the lack of symmetry. A distribution is symmetric when it is placed the same to 
the left or right of the center point (Milton & Arnold, 1986). The skewness for a normal 
distribution is zero and all symmetric data should have near zero values for their skewness. 
Negative values for the skewness imply that data is skewed left, whereas positive values for the 
skewness indicate that data is skewed to the right. In this paper, we define skewness with a 
slightly different meaning. Tskewness (TSKI ) refers to the degree of inclination toward earlier 
time periods.  
 Figure 2 shows the number of hits during the first 28 days after the release of the two 
worms. The data shows that some worms peak earlier while others peak a later. This affects the 




Figure 2. The first month hit number of worms12 
We now illustrate how Tskewness is computed. At the outset we develop an index by 
using the frequency over a specific number of days. In the example shown below, we 
demonstrate the computation using 28 days (a month). As a result, we use the equation for the 
skewness index as,  
3( )










In equation (1),  
mV  = index value of date from 1
st to 28th for each m,  
mY = mean from 1
st to 28th, the mean value is fixed with 14.5 point. 
mPeak = specific date of Peak hit from 1
st to 28th date, 
my
S =standard deviation from 1st to 28th. 
To makeTSKI ’s minimum value zero, we added the absolute minimum value of 
skewness index. 
3(14.5 )






TSKI V Tskew index
S
−
= +  
| _ |minimumTskew index = absolute minimum value which was computed from 
equation (1). This absolute minimum value means that the peak hit occurs at the last day (28th 
day) so that TSKI is greater than or equal to 0.  
The mean and median for 28 days are 14.5, and standard deviation (S) is 8.23. Therefore, 
the range of TSKI is calculated as follow: 
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The range of Tskewness index is 
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The closer TSKI is to 9.8468, the larger impact of spread speed the worm has. This is 
important in that TSKI makes it possible to compare speed of spread, significant to measure the 
impact among worms. For instance, each TSKI for two worms in Figure 2 is  
3(14.5 4)
( / ) | 4.9234 | 8.7527
8.23
3(14.5 25)
( 32 / . @ ) | 4.9234 | 1.0941
8.23
TSKI JS fleaA






‘7.66’ (8.7527-1.0941), the value difference between ‘JS/FleaA’ and ‘w32/yaha.P@mm’, 
implies that JS/Flea A has a greater detrimental impact than w32/Yaha.P@mm. 
• Early time period hit number (LMH) 
 Early time period number of hits is defined as the number of hits of a worm from the 
release date upto the date of measurement which in this illustration is the first month after the 
worm was released. Since the number of hits varies considerably across the various worms, we 
use the log value for our computations and for graphing purposes. For the number of hits in first 
month, we use the acronym Log of Month Hit (LMH) 
• Damage potency (DP) 
The common dimension, “damage potency” also acts as a dimension for STI framework. 
It is used as common criteria across both frameworks and in Section 7 we demonstrate how it is 
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used in computing the GSI Index (explained later). The dimensions for two frameworks are 
summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2. The factors for the frameworks 
Factors Initial Explanation 
Total number of 
hits  
LTH 
The total number of machines infected by worms for the life of the 
worms 
Hit density  HT The ratio of the number of hits of a worm for the first month to the total number of hits during its lifespan 
Early time period 
number of hits  
LMH 
The number of hits of a worm for the first month after the worm 
was released 




A rating used to calculate vulnerability, based on the relative 
damage incurred if a threat should exploit vulnerability13. 
4. Data Collection 
The data used in this paper is based on the records of email worms from January 2003 to 
May 2004 captured by Symantec and Messagelabs on their website14. The worms for which data 
was available had an active life of at least one month to a year and a half. This includes all of the 
significant worms during that period. All worms that Messagelabs and Symantec deal with were 
related to email. This data is a relevant sample for this study as the focus of this study is to be 
able to categorize email worms. 
This data includes a variety of variants that refer to the modified version of a worm. 
These variants are usually developed purposely by a worm author or by someone who modifies 
the original worm15. In case of variants of a worm, it can be argued that organizations may be 
                                                 
13 Source : Symantec.com  
14 Source: http:// www.Messagelabs.com  
15 Inforsec glossary,  http://www.infosec.gov.hk/english/general/glossary_uw.htm#Variant.   
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able to benefit from the experience of having dealt with the original worm through learning 
effects. However, it is important to note that the evidence of learning effect per se cannot be 
easily identified for a variety of reasons. First, variants usually spread roughly at the same speed 
as their parents worms (Lemos, 2003) or may even have more critical effects than parent worms. 
For example, the Sober.Y variant of the Sober worm has resulted in the worst and largest email 
worm outbreak in 2005 (Keizer, Nov 23, 2005). Second, variants have become a major stream of 
creating malicious code. A major trend in the past years has been the seemingly endless number 
of variants of particular viruses (MessageLabs, 2004). Also, variants show different payloads 
that result in different damage potency from the original worm. According to antivirus experts 
(Bruce Hughes, 2003), initial infections from original worm may be only the tip of the iceberg. A 
payload could for example, include a function to download a modified threat that cannot be 
detected by current patches. For illustrative purposes, in Table 3, we show the difference with 
regard to payload (Advisory, January 28, 2004), between Mydoom.A worm and Mydoom.B.  
Table 3. The different payloads between parent worm and a variant 
Worm Payloads 
Mydoom.A worm  Sends emails to users in the infected computer’s address book 
 Leaves a backdoor that can allow the computer to be accessed by a remote 
attacker. 
 The backdoor runs on TCP port 3127. 
 Sends continuous page requests to SCO.com as part of a distributed denial of 
service attack (DDoS) 
MyDoom.B 
 Variant 
 Overwrites the local host file to prevent the infected computer from accessing 
 Microsoft and anti-virus vendor update sites 
 Opens TCP ports 1080, 3128, 80, 8080, and 10080 for future backdoor access. 
The backdoor program has the ability to relay TCP packets, which provides IP 
spoofing 
 Capabilities and can facilitate future distribution of Spam emails. 
 Sends continuous page requests to microsoft.com as part of a distributed denial 
of service attack (DDoS) 
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Table 3 also shows worm variants may have different mechanisms to facilitate 
propagation from system to system.   
5. Independence Test of the STI and TLI frameworks  
In this section, we perform a Chi-square test to identify statistically whether the three 
dimensions are independent each other in two frameworks.  
• Independence test among dimensions of STI and TLI framework 
To establish that the dimensions of the STI framework are independent, a Chi-square test 
was performed. A similar process is followed to establish that the dimensions of the TLI 
framework are independent. Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the results of the Chi-square test based on 
the fact that each dimension is divided into two (or three) attributes namely high and low which 
is determined based on wheter the values are lower or higher than  the average values. There was 
no evidence to reject (H0) the hypothesis that Tskewness has no relationship with Log value of 
Monthly Hit number (LMH) in STI framework and Hit density has no relationship with total hit 
number (LTH) in TLI framework, respectively. In other words, Tskewness and LMH, Hit 
density and LTH have no relationship with one another. Table 4 shows that LMH is not related 
with TSKI (χ2=1.879, P>0.1) and that LTH is also not related with Hit Density (χ2=2.423, P>0.1) 
as shown in Table 5. Finally, Table 6 shows that damage potency does not have a relationship 
with the other dimensions. 
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Total Count 46 47 93 
Pearson Chi-Square=1.879(b),  df=1,  Sig. (2-sided) = 0.170 
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Total Count 46 47 93 
Pearson Chi-Square=2.423(b),  df=1,  Sig. (2-sided) = 0.148 
 
Table 6: Result of Chi-square test for DP and  other 
dimensions 
Results of DP and ~ Ch-square df Sig (2-sided) 
TSKI .414 1 .642 
LMH .171 1 .824 
HD 1.310 1 .179 
LTH .025 1 .874 
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• Relationship between the two frameworks 
If the STI Framework is to be utilized as a categorization mechanism, the dimensions of 
the framework (Tskewness and LMH) should show a relationship with the corresponding 
dimensions of the TLI Framework (Hit density and LTH respectively). Table 6 describes that 
correlation between each dimension. The table shows that Tskewness is positively related to Hit 
density (β=0.412, p<0.001), and LMH is positively related to LTH (β=0.952, p<0.001). 
Table 7: Correlation matrix among the 4 dimensions 
Dimensions Tskewness Hit Density LMH LTH 
TSkewness 1    
Hit Density 0.412** 1   
LMH1) -0.074 .198 1  
LTH2) -.207 .136 .952** 1 
DP -.030 -.019 .140 .142 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
1) LMH: log value of 1st month hit number 
2) LTH: log value of total hit number 
6.  Results of Comparing Frameworks 
We test correctness and explanatory possibility of the STI framework by comparing it to 
the TLI Framework by using a matching ratio16. It stands to reason that if they are well matched, 
STI can be assumed to be a proper method for the classification of email worms. Please note that 
the classification using the TLI framework is considered ground truth because the analysis is 
done after the worm has run its course.  
                                                 
16 Matching ratio: the ratio between the number of  viruses in a cell of STI framework and the  number of 
viruses in corresponding cell of the TLI framework 
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6.1 Two-Dimensional Categorization  
In this subsection we first present the results of the classification based on two 
dimensions since the third dimension is the same or forms the common criteria. The STI 
framework analysis was done using the first month of data. The STI framework can be used with 
early data in the sense that the analysis could have been done using a three days of data, a weeks, 
data, etc. The process remains the same. Figure 3(a) shows the STI framework using Tskewness 
and the LMH dimensions. The data for 93 email worms were used in this analysis. Cell 4 (STI4), 
to the top right corner is a cell characterized by high number of hits in the first month as well has 
a high extent of Tskewness. The opposite is true for Cell 1 (STI1). Clearly, email worms in Cell 4 
(STI4) would be considered to have the highest detrimental impact based on high TSKI and high 
LMH. In contrast, email worms in cell 1 (STI1) would have the lowest impact.   
The second picture on the right in Figure 3(b) describes the result using hit density and 
LTH. Cell 1 (TLI1), to the top right corner is a cell with properties of having high number of total 
hits as well has a high hit density. The contrary is true for cell 4 (TLI4). The matching email 
worms in each cell of the respective cells in Figure 3(a) and 3(b) are 13, 7, 9, and 23. The total 
matched worms for all cells are 52 out of a possible 93. The overall accuracy (matching ratio) is 
56% (52/93). The accuracy of each cell is 48.2% (13/27), 36.8% (7/19), 45% (9/20), and 85.2% 
(23/27), respectively. These values are substantially above similar ratios found in literature 
(Erlich, Gelbard, & Spiegler, 2002). However, these results are far from desirable so in the next 




A) Short Term Impact (STI) Framework B) Total Life Impact (TLI) Framework 
Figure. 3. Two-Dimensional Frameworks for categorization 
6.2  Three-Dimensional categorization with damage potency 
  
a) Short Term Impact (STI) Framework b) Total Life Impact (TLI) Framework 
Figure 4. Three-Dimensional Frameworks for Categorization 
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 In order to compare two frameworks with three-dimensions, we categorized the data in 
the 8 cells into four clusters or levels according to the number of high levels that each group 
includes. We followed the categorization scale of McAfee and Computer Associates to measure 
damage potency consistently. For example, if an area has high values in all three dimensions, the 
area will correspond to level or category 4 as the highest level. On the other hand, if the area has 
high values in only two or one of the three dimensions, it will correspond to level 3 and 2 
respectively. According to this categorization, the highest level (level 4) and lowest level (level 1) 
include one cell among the 8 cells in the Figure 4, whereas levels 2 and 3 include 3 cells. It is 
clearly an easy way to classify email worms in the three-dimensional frameworks because the 
ranking among combinations with three-dimensions is determined explicitly. Therefore, a 
comparison among those cells can make clear the strength of each level, in contrast to two-
dimensional comparisons. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) shows that result of categorization. The result 
show the number of worms each level in STI framework is 23 (15), 33 (36), 27 (35), and 5 (7) 
categorized by dimensions in level 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively. The numbers in parenthesis 
indicate the number of each level 4, 3, 2, and 1 in TLI framework. The matching ratio of each 
level indicates the number of worms that the STI framework predicts, divided by the number 
of true worms that are included in each level. According to the results, the matching number 
in the TLI framework is 13, 19, 20, and 3. The number of true worms for each level in the TLI 
framework from Figure 4(b) is 15, 36, 35, and 7. Therefore, the matching ratio is 86.7% (13/15) 
for level 4, 52.8% (19/36) for level 3, 57.1% (20/35) for level 2, and 42.9% (3/7) for level 1 
respectively. Finally, total matching ratio was (55/93) 59.2% and higher value than the result 
from two-dimensional categorization. The results show a dramatic improvement when all the 
three dimensions are considered. 
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7. Validity and Reliability test  
To identify the explanatory power for our frameworks, we first used the STI framework 
and the classification scheme to classify the email worms based on weekly data using 93 email 
worms. We then compared this with the classification based on complete impact information 
(TLI framework). We assumed that the TLI framework is the comparison standard reflecting 
ground truth as it considers data after the worm has run its course (we have assumed this is one 
and a half years). The results of the comparisons are presented using an adaptation of the Group 
Similarity Index (GSI) as remain of the section.  
7.1 Similarity Index  
In order to validate our framework for cluster analysis, we adapt a Group Similarity 
Index (GSI) from Erlich et al in 2002 (Erlich, et al., 2002). This index provides a simple and easy 
way of calculating how well the clusters are categorized. According to Erlich et al. (Erlich, et al., 
2002), the GSI is defined as “the ratio between the number of similar attribute values, i.e., the 
number of attributes that entities in a group commonly have and the total number of attribute 
values for all the entities in the group.” The expression for computing the group similarity index 








sa = the number of similar attribute values of a group  
G = a group of k entities which is [i1, i2,…, ik] 
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Sa(G) = the number of commonly shared attribute values in group G17 
m = the number of attributes, which indicates the product of number of attributes and 
number of entities 
GSI has an assumption that all attributes included in the analysis should have a property 
of mutual exclusivity i.e., an entity must obtain exactly one of the possible values for each 
attribute (Erlich, et al., 2002). since this study has the same property as previous work, we adapt 
and the simplified form for the group similarity index is given by the expression:  
6
1







∑ ,  
Where,  
c= cell level and t = time. 
sa = the number of commonly shared attribute in a level 
D= the number of commonly shared attribute in ith dimensions, 
A= the number of attributes, and 
G= the number of email worms in each level on TLI framework 
The number of commonly shared attribute Di , which was coded by binary number, is 
based on the number that email worms in each level are coded identically An email worm in 
each cell is checked against 6 factors (see Table 1) in two frameworks. For example, Table 8 
shows that the number of email worms matched with 6 factors for cell 4 in a month. The number 
1 in the table indicates a binary representation matrix value, which means that an email worm 
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,  
Where, j=attribute domain, k=number of entity, Pj= mutual exclusive possible value, so for each attribute 
aj, an entity can attain exactly one of Pj domain values. 
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has a factor value, and the number 0 indicates the email worm does not have that factor value. 
For example, if an email worm has high TSKI, the worm has the attribute “TSKI” and then is 
coded 1 and zero otherwise. Thus, commonly shared attribute means that email worms in a group 
have same number (1 or 0) on an attribute. Accordingly, Equation 2 has basically the same 
structure as Equation 1 in estimating GSI for worms in that two equation have same logic and 
property except that Equation 2 has fixed six attributes. In the summary in Table 8, 16 email 
worms have matched values of 13, 16, 16, 16, 16, and 16 on each factor respectively. Therefore, 
the number of commonly shared attribute in a cell sa is 93 (13+16+16+16+16+16). 
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Matched # 13 16 16 16 16 16 
 Table 9 shows the number of commonly shared attribute of each dimension of 
classification for each week on a cumulative basis from the first to the fourth week. In Table 5, 
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we show the GSI values that have been computed using equation 2. The Table shows that the 
accuracy of the classification improves with time.  
Table 9: Weekly GSI  





STI dimensions TLI dimensions 
GSI 
TSKI LMH DPinitial HT LTH DPfinal 
First 
Cell1 6 2 6 6 6 6 6 88.9% 
Cell2 42 17 20 28 25 41 41 68.3% 
Cell3 29 15 16 10 15 29 29 65.5% 
Cell4 16 11 10 7 7 16 16 69.8% 
Second 
Cell1 6 2 6 6 6 6 6 88.9% 
Cell2 42 17 17 26 28 41 41 67.5% 
Cell3 29 16 16 12 21 29 29 70.7% 
Cell4 16 14 15 10 15 16 16 89.6% 
Third 
Cell1 6 2 6 6 6 6 6 88.9% 
Cell2 42 17 17 26 26 41 41 66.7% 
Cell3 29 18 16 16 22 29 29 75.3% 
Cell4 16 14 15 13 15 16 16 96.9% 
A month 
Cell1 6 2 6 6 6 6 6 88.9% 
Cell2 42 17 16 25 28 41 41 66.7% 
Cell3 29 19 16 15 23 29 29 75.3% 
Cell4 16 13 16 16 16 16 16 96.9% 
 
The range for group similarity index is between 0 and 1. A GSI value of 1 implies 
maximum similarity and a value of 0 indicates minimum similarity between email worms.  
Based on the adjusted equation, we compute the GSI for all the clusters 4 weeks after the 
release of the worm using equation 2 as shown in expression 3. 
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These results suggest that the classification method applying two frameworks which was 
developed in this study is valid and reliable method to cluster email worms. 
Figure 5 indicates the GSI trends of the STI framework during the period from 1 week to 
4. The Figure shows that the prediction rate increases for all of the categories except for category 
two for which we see slightly reduced values. For example, for 6 worms in cell 1, GSI of week 1 
reveals that STI framework with 1 week data can predict 88.9% of true worms which are based 
on TLI framework. The figure shows that the prediction rate increasing but cell 2 which is 
slightly reduced. This decrese in GSI is caused by migration of the placement of worms into 
other cells in some particular dimensions. As seen in Table 9, the GSI changes as the number of 
one of six dimensions is changed. In the case of cell 2, the GIS decreased, as the number of LMH 
and DPinitial are reduced over time. That is, several worms which were placed  in cell 2 moved 
into a higher level such as cell 3 or cell 4.due to increase of hit number over a certain period of 
time (i.e. weekly base in this case). As a result, the GSI of cell 2 was decreased, while the GSI of 




Figure 5. Weekly Trend of GSI 
 The GSI method further gives support to the categorization that we have employed. 
Table 10 shows the overall GSI results for a month unit.  
Table 10: Clustering using a month of GSI 
Level N GSI Members 
1 6 88.9% S/Flea.B; JS/Forten.B-m: W32/Dumaru.F-mm: W32/Dumaru.I-mm; 
W32/Kindal-mm; W97M/Ethan.d095:  
2 42 66.7% 2JS/Flea_A; JS/Forten.E-m; VBS/Redlof.E-m; VBS/Soraci ;          
w32/Gibe.C@mm; w32/Israz@mm; W32/Lovelorn.B-mm;    
W32/Mapson.A-mm; w32/Mimail.M@mm; w32/Mimail.P@mm;      
w32/Netsky.F@mm; w32/Nicehello@mm; W97M/Ethan.B;  
VBS/Lovelorn.dr; w32/Ganda.A@mm; w32/Gibe.B@mm; W32/Lirva.B-mm; W
32/Lovelorn.A-mm; w32/Mimail.A@mm; w32/Sober.C@mm;       
w32/Yaha.P@mm; JS/Netdex-m; VBS/Lubus.A; w32/Dumaru.B@mm; 
W32/Dumaru.E-mm; W32/Dumaru.G-mm; w32/Dumaru.M@mm; 
W32/Kriz.3863; w32/Kwbot.E.Worm; w32/Mapson.D.Worm; 
W32/Mimail.C; W32/Mimail.K-mm; w32/Mydoom.B@mm; 
W32/Nofear.A-mm; W32/Nofear.B-mm; W32/Tenrobot.B; 
w32/Yaha.AA@mm; W32/Yaha.P!15bb-mm; w32/Yaha.S@mm; 
w32/Yaha.T@mm; W32/Yaha.X-mm; W32/Yaha.Y-mm 
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3 29 75.3% W32/Beagle.K@mm; w32/Bugbear.B@mm; W32/Holar.L-mm; W32/Lovgate.F-
m; W32/Lovgate.G-m; w32/Mimail.I@mm; w32/Sobig.A@mm; 
w32/Swen.A@mm; W32/Swen.B-mm; W32/Torvil.D-mm; 
w32/Yaha.Q@mm; W32/Yaha.R-mm; w32/Beagle.F@mm; 
W32/Lovgate.L-m; w32/Mimail.L@mm; w32/Mimail.T@mm; 
w32/Sober.B@mm; w32/Sobig.D@mm; w32/Beagle.C@mm; 
w32/Beagle.E@mm; w32/Dumaru.Y@mm; w32/Dumaru.Z@mm; 
w32/Netsky.B@mm;w32/Netsky.C@mm; w32/Scold@mm; 
w32/Sobig.B@mm; w32/Sobig.C@mm; w32/Sobig.E@mm; 
w32/Sobig.F@mm 
4 16 96.9% Jw32/Beagle.A@mm; w32/Beagle.B@mm ; w32/Beagle.J@mm; 
w32/Beagle.N@mm; w32/Lirva.A@mm; w32/Mimail.C@mm; 
w32/Mimail.E@mm; w32/Mimail.F@mm; w32/Mimail.G@mm; 
W32/Mimail.H-mm; w32/Mimail.J@mm; w32/Mimail.Q@mm; 




93 81.9%  
8. Discussion and Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to develop a new method to classify email worms and to 
provide a mechanism to compare email worms by employing a visual framework. To this end, 
we have developed a statistically refined clustering measurement scheme. Our analysis is a first 
step in clustering email worms according to their detrimental impact.  More elaborate efforts are 
needed to refine the framework in the future. This study contributes to enhancing managerial 
practice. First, this study identifies factors, which are necessary to categorize email worms into 
three dimensions of STI framework: Tskewness (TSKI), Monthly Hit number (LMH), and 
Damage Potency (DP). The STI framework uses early data (3 days, week, two weeks, month, etc) 
to classify e-mail worms. We have shown that as we get more data the results become much 
stronger. The accuracy is quite significant validating the methodology. The methodology uses 
statistical techniques to establish that independence of the dimensions and also the positive 
correlation between the two frameworks. 
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Second, this study applies GSI to our framework for clustering of email worms to 
enhance validation and reliability. The study has identified an important need that is related to 
provide a way to do early triage of Malware that will assist organizations to allocate resources 
for response.  
This study also has several limitations. First, we did not consider the prevalence patterns 
of distribution, frequency, and seasonality, because this study was performed under the 
assumption that worms included in this study are in the equal conditions. As aforementioned, 
these constraints make it difficult for the frameworks to adapt in exploring changes of worms as 
time goes on. This could perhaps be overcome in future research with more specific 
experimental conditions. Second, we used the log value of hit numbers because of the difference 
(variance) of hit number unit between the email worms. It is possible that ‘Log value’ shrinks the 
difference between two email worms which have a huge disparity in the size.  We also assumed 
that the data at the end of one and a half years represents the entire life of an email worm in 
terms of hits.  
The study could be expanded by considering a larger data set. However, an achievable 
observation is that if we collect more information on email worms as a community; a more 
accurate prediction may be possible. In this study, we divided the factors into four categories 
based on high and low values. On the one extreme, we have the option of creating one or two 
categories. This would not have provided sufficient discrimination for action. The other extreme 
is the creation of 93 classes, one for each email worm which is clearly unreasonable. We chose 
to create four categories as these are most actionable from the point of view of the insurance 
companies and system managers. However, it is possible to draw other tradeoffs in terms of the 
number of clusters that could conceivably be created. Research in terms of developing an 
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economics analysis taking into account the detrimental impact of an email worm and the cost 
relating office-disruption, etc. is a potential area for future exploration.  A major limitation in the 
area of viruses and worms is the availability of data. 
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E-mail has become one of the most popular Internet services providing instant and 
convenient message delivery. Unfortunately, e-mail also enables the spread of spam mail which 
is unsolicited, unwanted, and inappropriate bulk e-mail (Neumann & Weinstein, 1997). Spam 
creates problems such as cost shifting, fraud, resource wastage, and the displacement of 
legitimate mail (Cournane & Hunt, 2004). Its proliferation is increasing rapidly and it is a 
potential threat to the credibility of email as a reliable and efficient means of communication 
over the internet. Further, the effect of spam on the infrastructure and conveniences provided by 
the internet has augmented privacy concerns among email users and has served to reduce users’ 
welfare. According to the Pew Internet Report (Fallows, 2003), 76% of the users who received 
spam responded that spam compromises their privacy18.  
Spam email evokes both direct and indirect privacy concerns19 in users (Sipior, Ward, & 
Bonner, 2004). Privacy concerns that are derived from spam may be indirect as spam focuses 
                                                 
18 Privacy is defined as “the ability of the individual to control personally information about one’s self (E. 
F. Stone, Gardner, Gueutal, & McClure, 1983: p. 460).” or “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others (Westin, 1967: p. 7). 
19 Privacy concerns refer to an individual’s subjective views of fairness within the context of information 
privacy(A. J. Campbell, 1997). According to this definition, privacy concerns include individual’s 
personal traits or general disposition to privacy invasion. The concerns for information privacy are 




users’ attention on privacy when they receive spam mail. In addition, spam email immediately 
raises concerns about privacy, concerns that are triggered by perceived harm when information is 
released by the offending party (Wathieu & Friedman, 2005). The foregoing raises the research 
question: does the receipt of spam alert the user to privacy concerns? This issue has not been 
examined to any extent thus far, although there exists a relationship between spam email and 
privacy concerns. A study of the relationship between spam and privacy can provide benefits to 
the information security field. It may draw attention to the way in which spam email can affect 
users’ behavior with respect to their email-usage by alerting them to internal concerns regarding 
their private information.  
Users may exhibit different behaviors by invoking defense or coping mechanisms, 
consciously or unconsciously, to deal with junk e-mail. For example, when they receive spam or 
junk email, some users may be discouraged from using the internet itself or they may harbor 
negative attitudes towards internet email, while others may solve the problem by finding and 
eliminating the problem using spam filters, changing e-mail addresses, ensuring that their e-mail 
address is not available easily on the internet, etc. Although these different behaviors exhibited 
by users depend largely upon the user’s personal characteristics, or his or her preferences, their 
attitude can be largely affected by cognition, affection, or beliefs (Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960) 
which may stem from a spam experience or because of privacy concerns. 
This paper attempts to examine the effect of privacy concerns on user’s behaviors after 
they have been exposed to spam e-mail. The contributions of this study are twofold: First, this 
study explains users’ coping behavior with regard to spam email as it relates to privacy 




protection. By paying attention to the underlying psychological processes and motives, the 
current study also provides insight on how email users behave while protecting their privacy. 
Second, this study provides a theoretical scheme for the users’ behavior with regard to spam and 
privacy. In other words, this study explains the effect of spam email and privacy concerns on 
users’ behavior by using a psychometric approach. 
This paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature on spam and privacy is 
discussed in Section 2. In Section 3, based on theoretical arguments, four hypotheses are 
proposed. The methodology for the analysis is contained in Section 4. Results and the summary 
analysis form the contents of Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, the implications of the findings for 
management policy and research on spam and privacy are discussed.  
2. Background 
In this section, at the outset, we provide a general background on the effects of spam along 
with an overview of the background literature as it relates to the topic of this paper. This section 
also includes a discussion of defense mechanisms and user behaviors, i.e. usage-oriented and 
protection-oriented behaviors. 
2.1. Spam and Privacy 
Spam is unsolicited electronic mail, most often in the form of commercial advertising 
(Cournane & Hunt, 2004). According to the Federal Trade Commission20, in the United States 
two out of three of these messages contain misleading information. Some consumers find 
unsolicited commercial email - also known as "spam" - annoying and time consuming; others 
                                                 
20 Federal Trade Commission, False Claims in Spam, April 30, 2003. Available from: 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/spam/030429spamreport.pdf. [Accessed 25 December 2006]. 
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have lost money to bogus offers that arrived in their email in-box. Companies have reported 
financial losses due to the costs of unwanted spam traffic. Judge et al. (2005) demonstrate in 
their work how spam detrimentally affects internet use for company business. 
In the economic context, spam cost European companies $2.8b in lost productivity alone. 
US based companies reported a loss of $20bn (Hinde, 2003). This loss includes the time it takes 
people to delete the messages, the cost of buying larger mail servers and storage systems to cope 
with inboxes flooded with spam messages, and the cost of having staff unclog networks 
overloaded by spam. According to a report by MacAfee, entitled “MacAfee Americans and spam 
survey”21, spam is the prime technology time waster (49%) as compared to other technical 
annoyances including automated voice response systems (24%) and slow internet connections 
(19%). This survey revealed that 49% of Americans spend more than 40 minutes per week 
deleting spam, while 14% reported that they spend as much as 3.5 hours a week - or 7½ days per 
annum - on this task. 
Hinde (2002) states that spam email has become a potent weapon for targeting 
unsuspecting consumers and stealing their money and identities. The new trend in spam 
according Hinde (Hinde, 2002), is its ability to enhance fraudulent schemes and victimize 
unsuspecting users. Certain traits of spam, particularly the low cost and the ubiquity of email 
usage, has made spam the best choice for internet fraudsters and identity thieves. Previous 
research on privacy in this area has focused mainly on economic effects (Huberman, Adar, & 
Fine, 2005; Odlyzko, 2002) or the privacy trade-offs that individuals are willing to make in order 
                                                 
21 Federal Trade Commission, False Claims in Spam, April 30, 2003. Available from: 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/spam/030429spamreport.pdf  [Accessed 25 December 2006]. 
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to access specific services (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2003, 2005; Hann, Roberts, Slaughter, & 
Fielding, 2004; Syverson, 2003).  
In much of the published literature that addresses the disparities between stated privacy 
attitudes and actions, the implicit assumption is that people have privacy concerns.  
There is little research on the relationship between a user’s behavior and spam email as 
well as the mediating effect of privacy concerns on the relationship in an email usage context. 
By understanding whether a user’s behavior is affected by spam e-mail alone or if privacy 
concerns also play a role will allow us to design better systems to ensure a more satisfying 
experience for the user of e-mail systems. Studying this issue can also provide some 
understanding about the major reason why email users cope with spam email. Regarding users’ 
behavior, previous research has only shown the privacy paradox which contends that users 
behave irrationally regarding private information. For example, Syverson (2003) shows that 
users place a high value on privacy while they paradoxically disregard their privacy in exchange 
for meager benefits such as a free hamburger or a two dollar discount on groceries. In this paper, 
we establish that users exhibit both passive and active dual behaviors after a spam experience 
and especially if they have privacy concerns. 
2.2. Defense Mechanisms 
Individuals go through a series of reactions when they are personally confronted with 
anxiety—they develop a number of internal defense mechanisms to protect themselves from the 
unpleasant feelings of anxiety (de Board, 1978). Anxiety not only arises from perceived external 
dangers, but can also be experienced within the individual for no obvious reason (de Board, 
1978). This internal resistance called anxiety is often caused by past experiences, fears, or 
worries the individual has experienced (Wayne & Andrew, 2001).   
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Defense mechanisms are habitual and unconscious strategies used to deny, distort, or 
counteract sources of anxiety and to help maintain an idealized self-image (Cramer & Block, 
1998). Defense mechanisms lie on the surface of human conduct and can be observed without 
the help of any explicit or standardized assessment procedure (Hentschel, Juris G. Draguns, 
Ehlers, & Smith, 2004). In fact, they can be measured by automatic psychological processes that 
protect the individual from anxiety and from the awareness of internal or external stressors. 
Email-users, for example, are often unaware of these processes as they operate, even though 
defense mechanisms mediate the individual’s reaction to emotional conflicts and internal and 
external stressors (p. 751)22”. According to Holmes (1985) there are three central features of 
defense mechanisms: avoidance or reduction of negative emotional states, distortion of reality to 
various degrees, and the lack of conscious awareness in the use of defense mechanisms. Vasiliuk 
(1992) identifies the following four types of experience as antecedents to the reliance on defense 
mechanisms: stress, frustration, conflict, and crisis. Several or all of these four conditions can 
occur together. Even though psychoanalysis has traditionally focused on internal threats and 
conflicts, the fact that external dangers could trigger defense mechanisms has been recognized 
(Draguns, 2004). 
Due to these characteristics, defense mechanisms have been used to examine individual 
reactions to organizational change (see Carnall, 1986; Oldham & Kleiner, 1990; Ondrack, 1974; 
Wayne & Andrew, 2001). However, there is a lack of research on users’ reactions to the Internet. 
Defense mechanisms represent more an effort to confirm, adapt, or adjust to one’s surroundings 
rather than an effort to influence and mould those surroundings to fit one’s own desires and ideas. 
                                                 
22 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. Washington, 
DC., The Association, 1994. 
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Accordingly, users will manifest their behavior on spam or privacy in various avoidant ways 
such as undoing, repression, denial, and so on. For example, the act of ‘undoing’ involves 
nullifying a distressing experience through a reverse action (Clark, 1991). ‘Repression’ involves 
removing from one’s consciousness painful or shameful experiences (Waldmann, 2000); this 
process enables an individual to ‘conveniently forget’ their own undesirable and unethical 
behavior. On the other hand, ‘denial’ is a defense mechanism which a person may rely on in an 
attempt to protect himself of herself from some painful or frightening information related to 
external reality (Breznitz, 1983). Email users particularly choose avoidance tactics such as 
undoing or denial when coping with spam in an online context. For instance, users may try to use 
e-mail less frequently to avoid the annoyance or to protect their privacy. 
2.3. User’s Behaviors 
Bovey and Hede (2001) claim that when users attempt to protect their privacy, their 
behaviors can be classified as active or passive. Accordingly, we categorize users’ behavior as 
being (a) usage-oriented (passive) or (b) protection-oriented (active). In the remainder of this 
section, we discuss these two behaviors. Users may have several ways to protect their email 
accounts from spam or junk mail. They consciously or unconsciously use well-developed and 
habitual defense mechanisms to protect themselves from spam email and from related anxieties. 
Users can protect private information by reducing their email usage or by simply avoiding it 
altogether. On the other hand, by reporting spam or using protection programs and filters, they 
can aggressively counter spam mail. Post-spam behavior differs depending on the subject’s 
previous spam experiences and privacy concerns.  
The foregoing two behaviors are different in that usage behavior is a typical defense 
mechanism, while the second behavior is just defensiveness. According to Cramer (2004), the 
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term defense mechanism is a theoretical construct that describes a cognitive operation where as  
defensiveness is a more general term which refers to behaviors that protect the individual from 
anxiety, loss of self-esteem, or other disrupting emotions. Further, Cramer (2004) argues that a 
critical distinction between a defense mechanism and defensiveness is that the former is focused 
on an unconscious or conscious attitude, while the latter may be consciously recognized by the 
individual. 
2.3.1. Usage-Oriented Behavior (UOB) 
We use the term “usage-oriented behavior” to describe a behavior that relates to avoiding 
or reducing email use. This is a typical defense mechanism in the guise of avoidance behavior. 
Individuals are often unaware of these processes as they operate. Defense mechanisms mediate 
the individual’s reaction to emotional conflicts and internal and external stressors.23 The matter is, 
as Kraut ( 2005) mentions, not so much that dealing with junk email or spam is no longer a mere 
nuisance, but also one that it leads internet users to have privacy concerns. As a result, users may 
try to avoid using email on the internet as an effective method because the spam or junk mail 
might be too difficult for them to guard against with protective methods.  
2.3.2. Protection-Oriented Behavior (POB) 
We use the term “protection-oriented behavior” to describe a more active response to 
spam. Such actions may include reporting spam to the email provider and applying protection 
filters, or reporting spam to a consumer or government agency. In contrast to usage-oriented 
behavior in e-mail use, protection-oriented behavior represents the direct impact of spam and 
                                                 
23 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. Washington, 
DC., The Association, 1994. 
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perceived privacy on users’ behavior. Thus, protection-oriented behavior is defined as a “user’s 
positive defense behavior to protect their privacy from particular problems such as spam, 
hacking, and so on.”  
The difference between usage-oriented and protection-oriented behavior is not only the 
degree to which a user’s attitude towards privacy impingements are positive or negative but also, 
in contrast to usage-oriented behavior, protection-oriented behavior actively (rather than 
passively) protects against spam.  
In addition, protection-oriented behavior may depend on perceived privacy rather than 
spam because users may tend to give priority to protecting private information rather than 
avoiding spam. A likely reason why spam is perceived to be more threatening than ever is 
because internet users are beginning to recognize that spam is related to privacy intrusion. This 
study also assumes that users who know that junk mail or spam resulted from their behavior 
caused by using the internet will more likely to have privacy concerns. As a result, perceived 
privacy may provide mediating effects on the relationship between spam and protection-oriented 
behavior. That is, protection-oriented behavior may not be affected by spam directly.  
2.3.3. Independence of Two Behaviors  
Empirical and theoretical research shows that consumers often lack adequate information 
to make appropriate privacy-sensitive decisions and, even with sufficient information, they are 
likely to trade off long-term privacy for short-term benefits (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005). By 
contrast, however, users may reveal dual behavior when protecting their privacy, assuming they 
have enough information about protection. Usage-oriented behavior and protection-oriented 
behavior are two different and exclusive strategies. If users conduct one of these behaviors, they 
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do not engage in the other behavior, in general. That is, according to the definitions of the two 
behaviors as mentioned above, there are probably no intersections between usage and protection 
oriented behavior. 
This dissimilarity is not only because users who discontinue email usage do not have to 
take care of their email. On the other hand, email users who exhibit protection-oriented behavior 
use email without considering a reduction in email usage. Since the users acted to prevent their 
email from attacks, they also would not consider email as an alternative. 
The two behaviors (i.e., usage-oriented and protection-oriented behavior) that arise due to 
the receipt of spam are normally mutually exclusive. The rationale for this is that email users 
who exhibit protection-oriented (active) behavior are unlikely to engage in usage-oriented 
(passive) behavior. This relationship between the two behaviors (i.e. usage-oriented and 
protection-oriented behavior) may be violated because of privacy concerns or the receipt of spam. 
For example, if a user engages in both usage-oriented (passive behavior) and protection-oriented 
(active) behavior regardless of any other consideration, then we regard this behavior as dual 
behavior. 
In this study, we use term “dual behavior,” which refers to an action demonstrating two 
exclusive behaviors at the same time. When an email user tends to show this dual behavior as a 
means to cope with spam or privacy rather than to show just either one of two behaviors, we can 
say that the user is dual behavior. In other words, whenever users are aware of the circumstances 
surrounding them, or they feel that their privacy is vulnerable, they would manifest their dual 
behavior, even with perfect information.  
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3.  Hypothesis 
This study divides the hypothesis into two different parts. First, Hypothesis 2 and 3 
explore the effect of a spam experience and privacy concerns on usage-oriented and protection-
oriented behavior. In the second part of this section, we examine email users’ behavior by 
exploring the email user’s dual behavior. 
3.1. The Effect of Spam and Privacy on a Single Behavior 
In this section, we present a causal model that affects “Usage-oriented Behavior” and 
“Protection-oriented Behavior.” Figure 1 shows this study’s conceptual model for the effect of 
spam and privacy concerns on a single behavior.  
As the first issue of this study, we argue that a spam experience affects users’s concerns 
about the privacy of their information, as mentioned in our research question. Email users 
believe that spam threatens their privacy. Most users fear that their personal information might 
fall into the hands of unscrupulous people, such as marketers, who will then intrude upon them 
with unwanted calls and messages or worse (Fahlman, 2002). Han and Maclauin (2003) found in 


















Figure 1. Conceptual Model for Hypothesis 1 to 3 
 
In reality, spam is, indeed, a major privacy issue (Syverson, 2003). While receiving spam 
can be a consequence of users’ negligence in keeping their private information secure, it can also 
be the result of the illegal distribution of email addresses. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 1: The receipt of spam affects privacy concerns. 
Although the users’ experience with spam causes defensive behaviors, the experience can 
cause different types of behavior. Since usage- and protection-oriented behaviors may be 
motivated by hierarchically different levels of stimuli, the exhibition of one of those two 
behaviors depends on the level of stimuli such as spam experience and privacy. Along with the 
effect of spam experience on usage-oriented behavior, privacy concerns mediate the relationship 
between spam experience and usage-oriented behavior. Protection-oriented behavior precedes 
usage-oriented behavior in the degree of intensity. As a result, Hypothesis 2 is as follows:   
Hypothesis 2: spam experience and privacy concerns affect users’ usage-oriented 
behavior. 
Compared to usage-oriented behavior, protection-oriented behavior requires more effort 
for users to initiate the action because the behavior is more active and conscious. This means that 
users may not initiate the behavior without stimuli which seriously threatens them such as 
notification of fraud, warning of abuse of private information, and so on. One of the privacy 
concerns that can serve as an anxiety trigger is the recognition that private information can be 
abused by others. For example, without (implicit or explicit) agreements for other uses, privacy 
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is violated if the merchant later uses that personal information in a manner outside of this 
primary use (e.g., the merchant sells his customer list) or allows the information to be disclosed 
to a party not involved in the primary use as secondary use (R. G. a. M. D. Smith, 2005). In 
summary, protection-oriented behavior will not be conducted because of a spam experience but 
out of concern for privacy  
Hypothesis 3: user’s experience with spam does not affect their protection-oriented 
behavior but privacy concerns do affect their protection-oriented behavior. 









Figure 2. Conceptual Model for Hypothesis 3 
 
When a user engages in both active (protection-oriented) and passive (usage-oriented) 
behavior at the same time, we term this behavior as dual behavior. This behavior is also viewed  
as the expectation is that he or she engages in one of the two behaviors but not both at the same 
time. Since usage-oriented behavior is mutually independent with protection- oriented, we 
assume that rational users would not undertake two behaviors, even though the users have 
extremely bothersome experiences with spam email. However, when users are annoyed, they are 
apt to act irrationally. Moreover, spam experience can lead users to undertake dual behaviors 
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simultaneously. For example, if users consider spam emails as very bothersome, this spam 
experience could cause users to exhibit usage- and protection- oriented behaviors at the same 
time.  
Furthermore, privacy concerns mediate the relationship between spam and the dual 
behavior. In other words, the users’ dual behavior would be caused not only by the impact of the 
spam experience but also by privacy concerns. Therefore, we propose, 
Hypothesis 4: Privacy mediates the relationship between the spam experience and a 
user’s dual behavior  
4. Methodology 
In this section, we present a methodology in terms of the data collection and the 
constructs that we have developed for this study.  
4.1. Data Collection and Research Method 
In order to test these four hypotheses, this study used ‘The Pew Internet and American 
Life Project’ data surveyed by the “Pew Internet Research Center” in 2003. The data was 
surveyed to determine Internet users’ attitudes towards spam and the use of email filtering from 
6/10/03 to 7/3/03. Individuals who were 18 or older participated in the survey. This Pew survey 
data contained about 4000 responses that related to all internet users. For this study, we filtered 
out 2,279 participants because they were e-mail users.  
The sample was confined to people who have email accounts and use e-mail every day. 
Of these 2,279 only 588 users were selected for analysis relating to Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 as they 
corresponded to all e-mail users who had a spam experience and then engaged in either 
protection-oriented or usage-oriented behavior but not both. From the set of 2,279 e-mail users, 
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1,490 exhibited engaged in either protection-oriented or usage-oriented behavior or both and 
their responses were used to test Hypothesis 4.  
4.2. Constructs 
This study uses two different constructs as dependent variables: usage-oriented behavior 
and protection-oriented behavior. 
4.2.1. Spam Experience 
Email users experience spam or junk mail each time they log onto the Internet. The 
experience is measured by the number of spam mails received on a given day or the percentage 
of spam mail in relation to the total daily mail. In the Pew research questionnaire, spam 
experiences are measured by the following items: “Of all the email you receive in your personal 
(account/accounts) on a typical day, what percentage are personal messages and what percentage 
are junk email or spam.” This construct was measured as a 7-point scale (1 implying “none” to 7 
implying “81 % or more”). 
4.2.2. Perceived Privacy Concern on spam 
Privacy is a uni-dimensional construct (H. J. Smith, Milberg, & Burke, 1996). However, 
in this study perceived privacy concern was captured in the original Pew research survey via a 
multiple choice question that asked users to respond to the question “which characteristics of 
spam affect their email usage”. The choices available to responders were: “spam has 
compromised users’ privacy”,  “Deceptive or dishonest content”, “Offensive or obscene content”, 
“the amount of spam online”, “the time it takes to deal with spam” and “it is unsolicited or you 
did not ask for it”, and “the damage it can do to your computer”. The responses were then 
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encoded on a dichotomous scale (yes / no) based on whether the respondent chose the answer 
“spam has compromised users’ privacy” or not.  
4.2.3. Usage-Oriented Behavior 
Usage-oriented behavior is defined by the construct referred to in the original Pew 
questionnaire as “reducing behavior caused by spam or junk mail”. This construct consisted of 
two items: “Reduced your overall use of email” and “Made you less trusting of email in general”.  
These items capture intent rather than actual amount of reduction in email usage. The 
construct ‘usage-oriented behavior’ is measured on a dichotomous scale based on the responses 
to the above two items. The construct, therefore, reflected the users’ behaviors by measuring 
their responses on a dichotomous scale (yes/no). If a survey respondent had responded in the 
affirmative to at least one of the two items, then we encoded the usage-oriented behavior as 
“yes” (implying that the user engaged in usage-oriented behavior). A “no” was encoded for the 
usage-oriented construct when the response to both items in the Pew survey was in the negative. 
4.2.4. Protection-Oriented Behavior 
This construct reflects a user’s positive defense behavior to protect their privacy from 
problems such as spam, hacking, and so on. According to Cramer (2004), protection-oriented 
behavior may be manifested as other mechanisms, such as acting differently than one feels, or to 
suppress a disturbing idea. In the original Pew survey participants were asked if they “Requested 
to be removed from a mailing list”, “Reported it to your email provider,” and “Reported it to a 
consumer or government agency” after experiencing spam. The user was deemed to have 
engaged in protection-oriented behavior (active behavior) if the response one or more of the 
above questions was in the affirmative. The remaining respondents were considered as not 
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having engaged in protection-oriented behavior. This provided us data for encoding the variable 
on a dichotomous scale. 
Causality among variables and the mediating effect of privacy was established using 
logistic regression (for more details on the procedure see Baron and Kenny (1986)) 
5. Analysis and Results 
The results and its analysis are presented in this section. The section is subdivided into 
four following sections: the relationship between a spam experience and privacy concerns, the 
effect of privacy on defense behaviors (usage-oriented behavior and protection-oriented), the 
effect of privacy concerns on dual behavior.  
 
5.1. The Relationship between a Spam Experience and Privacy Concerns 
First, to test the relationship between spam experience and privacy concerns, we analyzed 
this relationship in further study. To examine the relationship between a spam experience and 
privacy concerns, we conducted a correlation and logistic regression analysis. Table 1 shows the 
correlation matrix among four variables. The result indicates that a spam experience statistically 
relates to privacy (0.072, p<0.01). Moreover, this relationship is also revealed in Table 2. In this 
study, the results reveal that a spam experience has the possibility of alerting the user to privacy 
concerns. That is, the results show that when users have a spam experience, the probability that 
they are concerned about privacy is higher than users who do not have an experience with spam 
mail. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix 
Variables Spam Privacy Usage Protect 
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Spam Experience 1    
Privacy .072** 1   
Usage .221** .348** 1  
Protect -.012 .081** .174** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 2. Result of Logistic Regression 















Dependent variable: Privacy concerns 
Model :Chi-square=6.132,  p<0.05 df=1,   
5.2. Effect of Privacy on Two Defense Behaviors  
Given the result that a spam experience leads users to have privacy concerns, we analyzed 
the effects of each variable based on two behavior strategies. As a first step, we tested 
Hypothesis 2 as a means to reveal the presence of a relationship between a spam experience and 
privacy concerns and usage-oriented behavior. Then, we analyzed the relationship between two 
variables and protection-oriented behavior. Finally, the relationship between the two behaviors 
was tested. 
5.2.1. Effect of privacy concern on usage-oriented behavior  
We initially proposed that both the spam experience and privacy concerns would affect 
usage-oriented behavior in Hypothesis 2. To test Hypothesis 2, we used logistic regression 
analysis for the effect of privacy concerns and spam experience on usage-oriented behavior in 
the first step and the mediator role of privacy concern between a spam experience and usage-
oriented behavior in the second step. Spam experience and privacy variables were coded as a 
dummy variable. The result is presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Testing mediator effects using Logistic Regression 
Testing steps in mediation model B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Testing step 1  
Outcome: Usage behavior 
Predictor: spam experience -.818 .161 25.753 1 .000 .441 
Testing step 2  
Outcome: Privacy 
Predictor: spam experience -.371 .148 6.316 1 .012 .690 
Testing step 3  
Outcome: Usage behavior 
Mediator: Privacy  













Step 3 Model :Chi-square= 185.53, df=2,  p<0.001. 
When examining the results for step 3 in Table 3, the regression coefficient for spam 
experience was 0.763, which was significant at the conventional probability level (p<0.001). The 
regression coefficient for privacy was -2.009 (p<0.001), meaning that there was a significant 
relationship with usage-oriented behavior in the sample. Thus, the result supports Hypothesis 2 
because usage-oriented behavior is related to an unconscious, psychologically-based attitude. 
Users experience this behavior when they have negative feelings about spam. As mentioned 
before, usage-oriented behavior is a strategy which can easily be used to cope with spam or junk 
email. 
In addition, with regard to the mediation effect, we explored whether a spam experience 
per se affects usage-oriented behavior. Table 3 contains the analysis necessary to examine this 
mediation hypothesis. Following the steps outlined earlier for testing mediation, we first 
established that a spam experience is the predictor and is related to usage-oriented behavior by 
conducting a logistic regression for usage-oriented behavior on the spam experience in Step 1. 
The regression coefficient (b =-0.818, p<0.01) associated with the effect of a spam experience on 
usage-oriented behavior was significant. Thus, the effect of spam experience on usage-oriented 
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behavior is significant and the requirement for mediation in Step 1 is met (Baron & Kenny, 
1986).  
To examine the relationship between a spam experience and privacy concerns, we 
conduct a logistic regression for privacy concern on the spam experience in Step 2. The 
regression coefficient (b=0.371, p<0.05) associated with this relation also was significant. To test 
whether privacy concern was related to usage-oriented behavior, we conducted a logistic 
regression for usage-oriented behavior simultaneously on both privacy concern and the spam 
experience variable in Step 3. The coefficient associated with the relationship between the 
privacy concern and usage-oriented behavior was significant (b=-2.009, p< .0001). This third 
regression equation also provided an estimate of the effect of spam experience on usage-oriented 
behavior in step 1, the relation between spam experience and usage-oriented behavior, 
controlling for privacy concern. The effect of spam experience on usage-oriented behavior in 
step 3 was -0.763 with statistical significance in p< 0.01. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was supported.  
In summary, Table 3 shows that spam experience has its own affect on usage-oriented 
behavior and privacy concerns mediates between spam experience and usage behavior. 
5.2.2. Effect of privacy concern on protection-oriented behavior  
To test H2, a logistic regression analysis was conducted. We expected that spam 
experience does not affect protection-oriented behavior. Results from this model are reported in 
Table 4. Table 4 shows the result of the effect of a spam experience on protection-oriented 
behavior. The model is significant at the p<0.001 level (χ2=20.739). The result in Table 4 also 
shows that spam experience does not affect protection-oriented behavior (b=0.175, p>0.1). This 
result may be because protection-oriented behavior is more positive so that users should 
consciously consider doing this behavior, in contrast to usage behavior.   
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We also see from Table 4 that privacy concerns affect protection-oriented behavior (b=-
0.676, p<0.001). Therefore, the results from Table 4 support Hypothesis 3.  
Table 4. Logistic Regression 
Testing steps in mediation 
model B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 





















Chi-square= 20.739, df=2, P<0 .000. 
Refernce: privacy =0, no privacy=1;  Spam experience =0, no spam experience=1 
5.2.3. Effect of Privacy Concern and Dual Behavior  
In this study, we assumed that a rational user would engage in only one type of behavior, 
either usage or protection-oriented behavior. These two behaviors can be substituted for a 
defensive attack on each other but, under normal circumstances, users seldom engage in two 
behaviors as an integrated behavior simultaneously. If a user adopts a protection-oriented 
approach to block spam from their mail account, they would still use email. On the other hand, if 
the user adopts usage behavior due to spam, they would not experience protective behavior. 
These are the two approaches a user adopts while dealing with spam. However, if they have 
privacy concerns from spam, they may start using both approaches.  
According to the argument mentioned above, we test Hypothesis 4 by examining whether 
users selected both defensive behaviors when they perceived an impingement on their private 
information. In doing this, we created a new dependent variable “dual behavior” by combining 
usage- and protection-oriented behavior in existing data to fit within this analysis as follows. 
First, the defensive behaviors were integrated into one variable by being recoded as a binary 
variable (see Figure 3). If a user engaged in either usage or protection-oriented behavior, they 
would belong to quadrant Q1 or Q3, which in turn would indicate rational behavior. On the other 
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hand, if the user conducts dual behavior, they would belong to quadrant Q2 (see Figure 3) which 
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Figure 3: Data Gathering for Dual Behavior 
Quadrant Q4 (Figure 3) was omitted in this study because this variable is binary in the 
analysis. We encode dual behavior as a binary variable. (Users who behave rationally, by either 
engaging in active (protection-oriented) or passive (usage-oriented) behavior but not both, are 
encoded with the value 0; and users who engage in both active (protection-oriented) and passive 
(usage-oriented) behavior at the same time are encoded with the value 1). It may be noted that 
the new variable (dual behavior) has a statistically different sample from that used for 
Hypothesis 3. 
Using this new variable as a dependent variable, we can find the effects of privacy 
concerns on the rationality of user behavior. In other words, our hypothesis that privacy can 
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Results are shown in Table 5. In this Table, for spam experience at each step, coefficients 
are 0.445 (p< 0.05), -0.371 (p< 0.05), and 0.008 (p>0.1) respectively. In addition, privacy 
concerns as mediator was -0.764 (p<0.01) in step 3. Results indicate that privacy concerns 
perfectly mediate the relationship between the spam experience and combination behavior. In 
step 3, the effect of spam experience on integrated behavior was not significant (b=0.008, p>0.1) 
which means that the effect of a spam experience on combination behavior was mediated by 
privacy concerns. In addition, the result of step 3 indicates that privacy concern plays a 
mediating role in the relationship between the spam experience and integrated behavior (b=-
0.764, p<0.01). 
In sum, users are more likely to conduct both behaviors at the same time when they 
perceive privacy concerns as a result of receiving spam or junk email than when they do not 
have privacy concerns. Although the result shows a low likelihood for conducting both behaviors 
(Prob =18.3%), we can conclude that privacy leads users to enact both behaviors. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
Table 5. Testing mediator effects using Logistic Regression 
Testing steps in mediation model B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Testing step 1  
Outcome: Integrated behavior 
Predictor: spam experience 
 
 
.445 .209 4.522 1 .033 1.561 
Testing step 2  
Outcome: Privacy 
Predictor: spam experience -.371 .148 6.316 1 .012 .690 
Testing step 3  















Mediator: Privacy  
Predictor: spam experience  
Step 3 model: Chi-square= 8.157, df=2, P<0 .01. 
Dependent variable:  
Reference: privacy =0, no privacy=1;  Spam experience =0, no spam experience=1 
6. Discussion  
In this study, we distinguish between two strategic behaviors that email users can choose 
to use against spam and junk emails: usage-oriented and protection-oriented behavior. The 
purpose of this study is to explore mechanisms in relation to how users’ experience with spam 
and privacy concerns could function in terms of two behaviors, i.e. the effect of a spam 
experience and privacy. The results revealed several key findings. 
Primarily, our results show that a spam experience has a relationship with privacy 
concerns. With regard to this relationship, usage-oriented *behavior was affected by both spam 
experiences and privacy concerns. In addition, privacy has a partly mediating effect on the 
relationship between a spam experience and usage-oriented behavior.  
Secondly, for protection-oriented behavior, which was a positive and proactive strategy 
against spam mail, spam experiences were not significant. However, when users who have such 
an experience feel that their privacy is being threatened, they adopt protection-oriented behavior.  
Thirdly, the effect of a spam experience on both behaviors is a result of the mediation 
effect of privacy concerns. Results showed that users’ behaviors to protect their mail from junk 
or spam mails are not because of an experience with spam but instead are due to privacy 
concerns.  
We have structured the remainder of this conclusion section into two sub-sections. In the 
first sub-section we discuss the implication of this research and in the second sub-section we 
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discuss the limitation of this research. The limitations also represent issues that need further 
investigation and hence are topics for further research. 
6.1. Implications for Research 
This study has several implications for research and practice on privacy and spam mail. 
First and foremost, this study explains the use of defense mechanisms in users’ privacy 
protection behavior. Psychoanalytic theory provides the conceptual framework for understanding 
unconscious or conscious processes that are simply described as thoughts and desires for the 
protection of one’s privacy. By paying attention to the underlying psychological processes and 
motives, the current study responds to questions of how email users behave in order to protect 
their privacy.  
Second, this study presents a theoretical initiative for users’ behavior with spam and 
privacy. There has been little research on an email user’s behavior for protecting their privacy 
and preventing spam email. This study explains the role of spam email and privacy concerns on 
users’ behavior by using a psychological process.  
Third, this study reveals that a spam experience has a limited impact on users’ 
protection-oriented behavior. Results show that a spam experience might have a significant 
effect only on passive behavior but not on active behavior. In practice, we assume that a spam 
experience may affect users’ behavior, but the preliminary analysis shows that spam has a 
limited impact on behavior. Privacy has more of an impact on these behaviors by making the 
users aware of risks from spam. 
This study also reveals that an experience with spam has different effects according to 
users’ behaviors. Regardless of the severity of the two behaviors, the spam experience affects 
usage-oriented behavior but does not affect protection-oriented behavior. According to the 
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characteristics of the two behaviors, a spam experience is related to passive behavior, which is 
easy to choose without any physical efforts. That is, the experience with spam is considered as 
the factor which brings about privacy concerns rather than as a critical factor that causes users to 
make more efforts to protect their email from spam or privacy attacks.  
Finally, this result shows that privacy concerns lead users to resort to dual behavior. In 
practice, the concept of rational action is clearer in the field of economics than in psychology. 
This clarity is due to the fact that economics views rationality in terms of the choices it produces, 
whereas psychology views it in terms of the processes it employs (H. A. Simon, 1982; Herbert A. 
Simon & Thaler, 1986). The two different behaviors (usage-oriented and protection-oriented) are 
exclusive to each other so that it is enough for users to choose only one behavior to protect their 
email.  
The study shows that privacy is important in explaining users’ dual behavior. Although 
this study does not explicitly reveal that users are dual behavioral decision makers, the study 
demonstrates why users exhibit both behaviors to prevent spam or junk mails at the same time. If 
users are more concerned about privacy due to a spam experience, the user’s behavior is likely to 
be highly dual behavior. According to the study, dual behavior comes from extreme concerns for 
protecting private information, whereas spam experience is not a determinant which makes users 
act with dual behavior. However, as users experience more spam they are likely to perceive their 
private information as vulnerable to attack. Their perception of privacy concerns eventually 
leads them to adopt both approaches. 
7. Conclusion 
Despite these implications, this study has some limitations. Firstly, although results were 
statistically significant, this study uses secondary data which was collected by surveys for 
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general internet use. For this reason, we recoded the data. Secondly, with regard to the secondary 
data, measuring scales for variables were inconsistent with each other which makes the study’s 
reliability low for a generalization of the results. We cannot say that the analysis is best for 
measuring dual behavior. This study can be treated as exploratory and as a means to define the 
need for a future study in this area. 
This study sheds light on the effect of spam experience, privacy concerns, and users’ 
strategies on spam email. The model shows that privacy plays a mediating role in the relationship 
between the spam experience and the users’ behavior. Moreover, this study reveals that when 
users are faced with privacy concerns, they demonstrate dual behavior (i.e. both active and 
passive at the same time). We hope that this study will spur researchers to examine and amplify 




Essay3: Perceived Information Assurance, Risk, Resilience, and 
Information Systems Effectiveness in the Context of Disasters  
 
1. Introduction  
Much of the research on extreme events has focused on the physical, economic, or 
environmental impacts of mass disasters24. Beyond the physical and financial devastation and 
loss of human life, mass disasters wreak considerable toll on the work life of humans as well 
(Weems et al. 2007). The toll on worklife may lead to loss of productivity and motivation at a 
time when, because of the lack of resources experienced during disasters, more is demanded 
from employees and systems. As a result, employees may come to believe that their 
organization’s information systems cannot effectively support them in accomplishing their tasks 
during such critical times.  
Despite the likelihood of impact on employees, and subsequent impact on organizational 
performance, resilience (the ability to persevere and thrive despite considerable disadvantages 
and threats to success) is a characteristic that may have a positive effect on effectiveness. Mallak 
(1998) argues that resilient organizations have an impact on the resilience of employees. Much 
of the previous research in resilience has focused mainly on the detrimental physical impact of 
disaster on critical infrastructure (Barton 2006; Calhoun et al. 2004). 
Further, since the risks of business discontinuity increasingly depend on information 
systems infrastructure (Cerullo et al. 2004), the effectiveness of organizations’ information 
                                                 
24 By disasters, we specifically refer to extreme events. For the purposes of this paper we focus 




systems should be strongly tied to business continuity (i.e., as the processes that seek to ensure 
that organizations are capable of withstanding any disruption to normal functioning (Elliott et al. 
2002)). The most important aspects of the business continuity plan include protecting 
organizational assets and restoring critical business functions in order to continue to provision 
service to members and providers (Devaney 2007).  
In the context of hospitals, during a disaster, the ability to keep operating using its 
information systems is based on its organizational resilience and the ability to identify risks 
affecting hospital services. In addition, issues critical to maintaining an information system 
during a disaster relate to threats to cyber-security, which include (but are not limited to) 
unauthorized access to a system, disruption/denial-of-service, unauthorized use of a system, or 
unauthorized changes to system hardware or software.  
In the case of hospitals, the proper use and functioning of electronic medical records in 
the provisioning of health is critical: there is dependence on the electronically stored information 
which needs to be available at all times. Further, patient confidentiality needs to remain upheld at 
all times. These factors result in an environment that makes perceived risk and resilience critical 
issues (see, Jensen et al. 2007). Information security and privacy are very important issues in 
healthcare organizations (Bhatti et al. 2007) and there are several mandates such as the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules, for 
the protection of patient data. Therefore, when employees perceive that patient information 
might be inadvertently vulnerable to compromise or that a system might be disrupted caused by 
natural disaster, the perception of risk may affect employees’ effective use of information 
systems regarding their works.   
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The aforementioned issues lead to a reduction in an organization’s ability to accomplish 
its mission effectively (Paton et al. 2000), and also lead to a reduction in resilience. Even though  
prior research shows that risk and resilience are two interactive factors that have different, 
overlapping, or common causal mechanisms (Haeffel et al. 2007), it is not clear how perceived 
risks and resilience operate in conjunction with each other to impact the effectiveness of 
information systems (IS) in a disaster context. We have yet to understand how the effectiveness 
of hospital information systems is affected by disasters and extreme events. 
In order to bridge this knowledge gap, the current study examines three specific research 
questions in the context of hospital information systems users: (1) How does perceived risk 
resulting from extreme events affect the perception of the effectiveness of information systems? 
(2) How does organizational resilience enhance the perception of individual and organizational 
performance? and (3) How does a disaster affect the relationships between constructs such as 
perceived risk, information assurance, organizational resilience, and hospital information 
systems (HIS) effectiveness? In addition to our main analysis, we also examine the effect of both 
organizational resilience and information assurance on hospital information systems 
effectiveness based on the different HIS user groups (i.e. clinical user and administrative user) in 
a post hoc analysis of the data. 
This research attempts to provide a deeper understanding of how perceived information 
assurance, employees’ perceived risk, information assurance, and organizational resilience affect 
the effectiveness of the information systems in the context of extreme events using data from 
hospitals. In particular, we argue that perceived risk decreases the information systems 
effectiveness in the following ways: (a) perceived risks carry negative effects on perceived 
information assurance and perceived organizational resilience that lead to increase in 
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effectiveness of information systems that help the organization, and (b) the perceived 
organizational resilience affected by information assurance perceptions translates mechanism to 
enact the effective use of information systems. Perceived organizational resilience should act as a 
viable translating mechanism in this case. Therefore, perceived risk decreases users’ attitude 
toward the information systems by transferring the negative effect of the risk perception to the 
perceived organizational resilience. The major contribution of this research is that it empirically 
provides a psychological mechanism on perceived risks, perceived information assurance, and 
organizational resilience for the usage of information systems under the disaster. According to 
the information systems literature, such psychological aspects in linking risks and organizational 
resilience have not been empirically investigated.   
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature in the area. In 
the following section, the causal relationships (hypotheses) are examined and explicated. The 
proposed methodology for the analysis is included in the methods section while results and 
discussion follow in final section. 
2. Background and Literature Review   
2.1 Background of Disaster 
The ice storm that impacted Buffalo, New York on October 12-13, 2006 has become known as 
the October Snow Storm. One of the biggest storms in the region’s history, the October Snow 
Storm left behind a legacy of downed trees, lost power, and intense snow and flooding. In the 
immediate aftermath of the storm, approximately 300,000 residents were without electric power 
and some residents (100,000) had to endure as many as 10 days without electricity. On Tuesday 
October 24, 2006, President Bush declared Western New York a major disaster area in the wake 
64 
 
of the off-season snowstorm that decimated and defoliated the area. The Western New York 
region is well-prepared and well-equipped to effectively deal with typical snow storms and 
blizzards; there is a well-oiled infrastructure of people, process, and technology in place to 
respond to snow storms and blizzard. However, the ice and snow storm hit in October which is 
markedly early for such winter weather; the timing of the storm rendered Buffalo ill-equipped to 
cope with the October snowstorm. The devastation was extensive and major portions of the 
region experienced power outages (Waikar et al. 1997). Roads were unusable due to debris and 
fallen live wires strewn across city streets rendering navigation dangerous if not impossible. 
Businesses providing survival essentials (e.g. food, gas) were no longer operable not only 
because of loss of power but also because of travel bans in the area. Several hospitals in the area 
were affected.  
While the influx of patients did not change much (in contrast to other natural disasters), 
the hospitals had to face severe resource constraints because employees could not drive in and 
there were no replacements coming in to take over when they were tired. Further, the limited 
user training of specific parts of the information systems resulted in additional problems because 
of the mismatch of staff reporting to work and having to perform tasks outside of the realms of 
normal functions.  
2.2 Theoretical Background 
Our theoretical framework builds on the information system success model (DeLone and 
McLean, 1992) and adapts the work of Paton and Johnston on disaster resilience (2001). Our 
study theorizes that perceived risk affects individual and organizational impact on information 
systems via organizational resilience and information assurance as well. There is now a growing 
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body of literature that informs on the importance and impact of perceptual factors as it relates to  
information systems’ effectiveness (W. H. DeLone & McLean, 1992; Rai, Lang, & Welker, 
2002). Unlike past research which predominantly focuses on users’ perceptions in business 
context, this study provides insight into employees’ perceived risk, organizational resilience, and 
information assurance - the perceptual factors that are important in a disaster context.   
We also theorize that perceived risk and resilience operate in conjunction with each other in 
impacting information systems effectiveness in a disaster context.  This investigation is aligned 
with work by Paton et al. (2001) who explained how natural hazards affected resilience via 
perceived risk. Prior research also established a link between employees' perceptions of 
information assurance and the goals achieved by effectively using information systems (Jean-No 
Ezingeard, McFadzean, & Birchall, 2005). In this study we propose that information assurance is 
an important factor that influences information system effectiveness in positive ways. 
In the remainder of this section we review literature to develop an understanding of the 
constructs in the theoretical model. Literature on each of the following constructs is presented: 
Information Systems Effectiveness, Hospital Information Systems (HIS) Effectiveness 
(Individual and Organizational impact), Resilience, Perceived Risk (External and Internal), and 
Information Assurance. 
2.3 Information Systems Effectiveness  
The concept of information systems success has been widely accepted in IS research as a 
principal criterion for assessing performance resulting from the usage of information systems 
(Rai, et al., 2002). Information systems success refers to the extent to which a given information 
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system actually contributes to achieving organizational goals (i.e., its effect on organizational 
performance) (Hamilton & Chervany, 1981).  
DeLone and McLean (1992) proposed, but did not empirically test, a model of IS success 
that included six constructs: system quality, information quality, use, user satisfaction, individual 
impact, and organizational impact (see Figure 1). The DeLone and McLean model for IS success 
assumes that system quality and information quality affect both user satisfaction and actual use. 
In addition, it posits that use and user satisfaction are reciprocally interdependent, and presumes 
these constructs to be direct antecedents of individual impact, which also has an effect on 
organizational impact. 
Although IS researchers have offered a variety of conceptualizations, the core of IS 
effectiveness remains the degree of organizational goals or performance triggered from the use 
of an information system (Hamilton & Chervany, 1981; Raymond, 1985). Regarding the 
measurement of IS effectiveness, it is difficult to identify a precise measure or set of measures of 
IS effectiveness that is common across all organizations (Thong & Yap, 1996). As Ives et al. 
[1983] point out, it is difficult to quantify intangible costs and especially the benefits of 
information systems (Lucas, 1981). Moreover, it is a complex task to objectively assess benefits 
and information systems for decision support. As a proxy measure, IS effectiveness is easier to 
operationalize. Therefore, to measure IS effectiveness, IS researchers have used not only diverse 
constructs, but also multiple measures that they are certain will accurately tap into a given 
concept (W. H. DeLone & McLean, 1992; Rai, et al., 2002; Seddon, 1997) such as individual 
impact and organization impact. In addition, because they have been widely accepted as valid 
and reliable constructs in the IS field for assessing IS effectiveness (See W. H. DeLone & 
McLean, 1992; Rai, et al., 2002; Thong, Yap, & Raman, 1996), such factors are appropriate to 
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Amended model of Delone & McLean (1992, 2003)  
Figure 1. Information Systems Success Model 
Information quality refers to measures of IS output—namely, the quality of the 
information that the system produces (Halawi, McCarthy, & Aronson, 2007). According to 
Nelson et al. (2005), information quality can be observed either from an intrinsic view, in which 
the properties of information remain largely isolated from a specific user, task, or application, or 
from a contextual view, wherein IS output is assessed based on the degree to which it is helpful 
in completing a particular task. System quality, by comparison, refers to measures of the 
information processing system itself. Past research has shown that elements of system quality 
often are intermingled with dimensions that are closely related to service quality and ease of use 
(See Rai, et al., 2002).  
Information quality is related most closely to the output of an IS, while system quality 
reflects the information processing system required to produce that output (Nelson, et al., 2005). 
Even though two qualities have different dimensions, sometimes confusion arises in 
differentiating system quality from information quality factors. When considering information 
and system quality together, it is useful to think of information as the product of a system, and 
the system as the information processing entity that produces the information (W. H. DeLone & 
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McLean, 1992). Interaction effects may exist between these two constructs (Nelson, et al., 2005).  
According to DeLone and McLean (1992), individual impact refers to the positive effect 
of information on individual behavior. These authors explain that the term “impact” in itself 
indicates performance or productivity. Several items have been used to evaluate individual 
impact, such as net benefits, individual job performance, and individual productivity. Seddon 
(1997) used the label “perceived usefulness” instead of “individual impact.” Rai et al. (2002) 
considered perceived usefulness to be an individual impact because it is based on several of the 
constructs DeLone and McLean (1992) had linked to individual impacts, such as improved 
individual productivity. Therefore, consistent with past research (See, Rai, et al., 2002; 
Sabherwal, Jeyaraj, & Chowa, 2006; Seddon, 1997), this study uses perceived usefulness as a 
construct of individual impact. In line with individual impact, organizational impact indicates 
the effect of information on organizational performance (W. H. DeLone & McLean, 1992; 
Hamilton & Chervany, 1981).  
In this study, the constructs “individual impact” and “organizational impact” are viewed 
as consequences of information systems usage. This usage reflects both these terms’ 
appropriateness for the study and three additional considerations: What qualifies as a benefit? 
For whom? And at what level of analysis? (2003p. 22). Specifically, even though DeLone and 
McLean use the term “net benefit” as the dependent variable, the net benefit concept has not yet 
been clearly defined so that “collapsing ‘individual and organizational impacts’ into a single 
variable, net benefit, does not make the problem go away” (2003, p.23). In addition, DeLone and 
McLean mentioned that net benefit is not a different concept from the “two impacts,” but simply 
a more parsimonious one. 
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2.4 Hospital Information Systems (HIS) Effectiveness 
A hospital information system defines the socio-technical subsystem of a hospital, which 
comprises all information processing, as well as the associated human or technical actors in their 
respective information processing roles (Haux et al. 2004). HIS allows for timely patient health 
information to those making health related decisions (Katehakis et al. 2002), in addition to 
facilitating the billing and administrative aspects in a hospital. Users of patient health 
information include physicians, nurses, lab technicians, administrators such as those involved 
with billing, records management, etc.  
Several studies have attempted to account for effectiveness from a perception perspective, 
given that attitudes are often affected and behaviors motivated by perceptions. Henry and Stone 
(1999) examined computer self-efficacy and outcome expectancy with hospital staff members 
using computer-based medical information systems and concluded that management support, 
ease-of-use, and computer self-efficacy had a positive influence on satisfaction.  
Understanding the role of perception in employees’ interactions with HIS, it is important 
to identify both individual and internal organizational factors that have potential to affect an 
individuals’ perceptions and attitudes, and behaviors as they attempt to most effectively use the 
information system. Anderson (1997) declares that, in relation to hospital information systems, 
several decades of experience with computer-based information systems have made it clear that 
the critical issues in the implementation of these systems are social and organizational, not solely 
technical. Likewise, since some degree of IS effectiveness is dependent on the users and on 
organizational factors, this paper argues that such factors may directly and/or indirectly affect 
hospital information system effectiveness.  
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In estimating the effectiveness of hospital information systems, at the outset, we consider 
organizational resilience and perceived risk as factors that affect a part of hospitals’ business 
continuity in a disaster context. Specifically, we explore the mechanism by which perceived risk 
and resilience facilitates (or obstructs) the impact of information systems on individual or 
organizational performance as an important part of business continuity. Secondly, perceived 
information assurance—the degree to which employees perceive that information security and 
privacy are assured—is proposed to have an effect on information systems effectiveness as 
articulated below. Sharing or using sensitive patient information in a large, distributed and 
heterogeneous hospital could bring out security and privacy risks (Braghin et al. 
2008) which might be compromised or threatened by attackers. These risks can 
lead users to carefully consider the system vulnerability in terms of security 
and privacy as important determinant for information systems effectiveness. It 
is recognized that security and privacy concerns are critical  obstacles in 
enhancing hospital’s improvement of hospital information systems (Goldman 
1998), even in a disaster context. Existing regulations, such as HIPAA, 
regarding health care information shows the important example in terms of 
security and privacy for patients’ records. Given these factors, the present study 
focuses primarily on the effect of perceived risk, resilience, and information assurance on HIS 
effectiveness. This will allow us to have a better understanding about the internal driving-forces 
for IS effectiveness in hospitals.  
It is important to note that while we treat hospital information systems as an entity, the 
reality in most hospitals is that there is an administrative and billing system that is distinct from 
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the electronic health record system (Reddy et al. 2008). Thus, the users of the systems can be 
viewed as either dealing with support (including administrative functions) or medical and health 
functions (for the purposes of the discussion in this manuscript we henceforth refer to them as 
‘medical users’).  In addition to considering the hospital information systems as a single entity, 
we also include analysis that presents perspectives based on usage (support and medical) by way 
of sub-group analysis. 
2.5 Resilience   
The term, ‘resilience’ has been widely used in various fields including ecology, 
psychology, economics, business, and applied critical infrastructure.  Consequently, diverse 
definitions garnish the literature determined by the research field of context. For instance, 
psychological resilience is viewed as a relatively stable personality trait characterized by the 
ability to bounce back from negative experiences and by flexible adaptation to the ever-changing 
demands of life (Block et al. 1996). It is also used to indicate a characteristic of resistance to 
future negative events.  
In disaster contexts, resilience refers to the capacity of an entity or system to maintain 
and renew itself particularly in the presence of stressors, or the ability or capacity of a system to 
absorb or cushion against damage or loss (Rose 2004).  In this case, resilience indicates the 
overall capability of an organization as a whole to respond to external catastrophes for business 
continuity. The concept of resilience is therefore associated with reduced failure probability, 




Past research on  resilience has been extended to various topics such as business coping 
behavior and community response (Tierney 1997), nonlinear adaptive response of organizations 
(Comfort 1999), and systems performance (Petak 2002). However, the concept of organizational 
resilience still receives little attention in the IS arena.  
Resilient organizations have the ability to “maintain positive adjustment under 
challenging conditions” (Sutcliffe et al. 2003, p. 95). In the face of disaster circumstances, a 
resilient organization is able to make better sense of what is happening, to take more effective 
action based on the sense that has been made, and is better able to manage threats as they unfold 
(Bigley et al. 2001). O’Rourke et al. (2003) found in their study, New York City was able to 
recover relatively quickly after September 11 not only because of the inherent redundancy of its 
physical infrastructures but also because of its institutional resilience. 
In the context of environments experiencing disaster, resilience extends to organizational 
success in post-disaster environments. Resilience in post-disaster conditions is distinguished 
from pre-disaster activities that reduce potential losses through mitigation, The construct of 
resilience must capture the ability of a system to respond and recover from an extreme incident 
(Dalziell et al. 2004). In this sense, resilience is not a static attribute that organizations do or do 
not possess but rather results from processes that help organizations retain their resources in a 
form sufficiently flexible, storable, convertible, and malleable to avert maladaptive tendencies 
and cope positively with the unexpected (Sutcliffe et al. 2003). This capability is important both 
to organizations that deal with critical uncertainty on a regular basis, and to individuals for whom 
crisis is an unfamiliar yet potentially very real circumstance (Barton et al. 2006).  
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2.6 Perceived Risk  
Risk perceptions is defined as a decision maker's assessment of the risk inherent in a 
situation (Sitkin et al. 1992). Research has long addressed how people perceive risk and how 
their decisions are affected by their the perceptions (Slovic et al. 1981). Perceived risk is 
believed to be a crucial factor in shaping policy, attitudes, and decisions (Sjöberg 2004).  In 
general, the concept of perceived risk is based on heuristics, which are often employed to reduce 
difficult mental tasks to simpler ones. When asked to evaluate risks, people make inferences 
based on what they remember hearing or observing about the risk in question using a number of 
general inferential rules.  According to Slovic et al. (1981), people seldom have statistical 
evidence about the impacts of risk, on hand. Thus, perceived risk refers to a collection of notions 
that people form, based on risk sources relative to the information available to them, and on 
common sense (Jaeger et al. 2002). This type of intuitive risk perception is predicated on how the 
information about the source of a risk is communicated, the psychological mechanisms for 
processing uncertainty, and earlier experiences of danger. Persons’ perceived risk is considered 
central to their evaluations, choices, and behaviors (e.g., Dowling 1999). The way an individual 
perceives risk depends on how he or she defines and values the outcome. Individuals perceive 
risk in relation to their wider beliefs about the risk issues and the more general implications that 
these have on their lives. For instance, beliefs about a risk issue may include both immediate and 
far-reaching consequences of accepting or not accepting the risk (Thomas et al. 1981).  
Researchers have also found perceived risk to be a consequence of higher levels of uncertainty 
(Mukhopadhyay et al. 2009; Oglethorpe et al. 1987). When people perceive risks, there is an 
expectation of some loss. It is also important to note that  employees’ perceived risk is negatively 
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correlated with intentions and behavior (Stone et al. 1987). In this paper, we study how perceived 
risks affect hospital information system effectiveness.  
Perceived risk in this regard are assessment of the risk inherent stemming as a 
consequence of risks of disruptions among interrelated external infrastructures (external risk) and 
disruptions of their information systems (internal risk) in disaster situations.  
External risk (ER) is caused by vulnerabilities resulting from interdependencies due to 
linkages of physical infrastructure with information systems, and external disruptions such as 
physical disruptions that affect an organization. For example, disruption of the civil 
transportation infrastructure may cause unavoidable absenteeism; appropriate personnel may be 
unavailable to operate the information system, thus preventing access to pertinent medical 
information as a consequence of the disaster (as was the case in the October Storm). When 
employees believe that infrastructures might physically affect their organization and respective 
information systems, they intuitively evaluate this risk source based on their subjective 
perception (Chen et al. 2010). 
Internal risk (IR) can be induced by the negative feelings relating to the effect of 
organizational disruption stemming from information systems related activity or lack thereof. 
The potential ineffectiveness of IS on provisioning of patient care can result not only because of 
the technology and its governance, but also from the actions of other infrastructures such as 
human resource, for example. Consider two infrastructures in an organization: information 
systems and the medical facility. Each infrastructure faces a certain risk of disruption that could 
render it non-functional to its primary clients (internal effect) and affecting other dependent 
infrastructures (external effect).  Therefore, perceived risks caused by the internal infrastructure 
in an organization can have a debilitating impact on the organization’s performance (which, is 
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largely based on the infrastructure). These negative externalities are an important feature of 
perceived risks (Heal et al. 2006). 
2.7 Information Assurance  
Ezingeard et al. (2007) describes information assurance as the certainty that the 
information within an organization is reliable, secure, private, accurate and available. They 
suggest that information assurance typically defines how these assets (i.e., data and/or 
information within both the tangible and the virtual bounds of the organization) should be 
secured to provide maximum benefit. The term, ‘information assurance’ is growing in 
acceptance and usage amongst a number of government and international agencies (Wolf 2003). 
Information assurance deals with protecting and defending information and information 
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, confidentiality, identification and authentication, 
and non-repudiation (DoD 1998).  Information assurance subsumes information security which 
focuses on the need to protect systems from internal and external attack, environmental threats 
and accidental damage (Whitman 2004). Information assurance provides a view of information 
protection that includes defensive measures in all three states of processing, storage, and 
transmission (Schou et al. 2004). This embodies providing for the restoration of information 
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.  It is these capabilities 
that produce the kind of defense required to comply with legislation such as FERPA and HIPAA. 
In this study, we refer to information assurance as the degree to which employees perceive 
that their information security and privacy is assured. Based on this characterization, this study 
examines how hospital information systems effectiveness is affected by information assurance, 
organizational resilience and perceived internal and external risks.  
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3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1 The Effect of Perceived Risk 
In a disaster context, people may perceive risk in terms of the disaster itself, the 
information systems disruptions caused by disasters, or the inter-organizational factors that may 
affect their activities. Specifically, as the interdependence of infrastructures increases, there is a 
growing risk that restoration efforts or uncertainties experienced by one sector could adversely 
affect the operations or restoration efforts of another, thereby contributing to further service 
disruptions (Saxton 2002).  Hospital Information Systems typically encompass several 
components such as platforms, applications, technologies, and people (both IT support staff and 
IT users). In a health care organization, the more the employees (both clinical and administrative) 
perceive external risk caused by a disaster, the more they perceive internal risk about the 
availability of Electronic Medical Resources, nurse scheduling data, and of information 
assurance (especially because of the potential misuse of personal health information (PHI) data). 
For example, the storm of October 12-13, 2006 in the Buffalo area affected stakeholders both 
physically and mentally and caused a concern that the hospital information systems would not be 
efficient and effective. This leads to our first set of hypotheses in the context of hospital 
information systems: 
H1a: perception of external risk will positively affect perception of internal risk.  
H1b:  perception of  external risk will negatively affect perception of information 
assurance. 
H2a: perception of internal risk will negatively affect perceived information assurance  
Existing literature on risk perception also finds that, perceived risk is negatively 
associated with perceived ability to combat the threat (Rimal 2001). Other related research shows 
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the negative relationship between consumer self-efficacy and perceived risk in the e-commerce 
context of online customers (Dash et al. 2007). People with high-risk perception perceive 
themselves as not being able to achieve their goals or overcome the situation. Perceived risk also 
motivates people to evaluate the level of their ability to cope in a given situation. Likewise, this 
relationship between perceived individual ability and perceived risk can also be viewed from an 
organizational resilience perspective. The belief is that employees’ perception about 
organizational resilience would diminish depending upon the degree of their perception of 
internal risk. Internal risks in organizations cause people to worry about their organizational 
infrastructures (e.g., hospital information systems in this case) as not being operated well or 
having the ability to cope with negative extreme events (Chen et al. 2008a). Eventually, the more 
risk employees perceive, the less likely they are to have a positive perception of their 
organization’s resilience. Our next hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H2b:  perception of internal risk will negatively affect perceived organizational resilience. 
Prior research shows a negative relationship between IT risks and IT project success 
(Jiang et al. 2001). According to Jiang et al. (2001), behavioral and technology-related risks can 
negatively affect information systems’ success either directly or indirectly. The research suggests 
that as perceived risk increases, people engage in different types of risk-reduction activities, such 
as the careful evaluation of alternatives, functionality or organization performance (See, Dowling 
et al. 1994).  In a disaster context, hospital employees who perceive high risk are likely to engage 
in a conservative evaluation of their individual and organizational performances and, in turn, 
internal risk will reduce the hospital information systems effectiveness. Proposed hypotheses 
regarding the relationship between interdependency risks and the hospital information systems 
effectiveness read as follows: 
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H2c: perception of internal risk will negatively affect organizational impact. 
H2d: perception of internal risk will negatively affect individual impact. 
3.2 The Effect of Information Assurance  
Information Systems are vulnerable for a wide variety of reasons. Hospital Information 
Systems are no exception, regardless of the fact that they have to be HIPAA compliant. A 
fundamental cause of many of the risks derives as a consequence of the variety of ways that 
individuals and/or groups can utilize digital technologies to engage in mistaken, inappropriate, 
criminal or other illegal online activities (Vlasti et al. 2004). Security breaches elevate one’s 
awareness of the price for failing to safeguard information systems in terms of reputation damage, 
loss of business, and valuation loss on stock markets (Dhillon et al. 2001; Ettredge et al. 2002). 
In the context of hospitals, this awareness is amplified because of the impact on the provisioning 
of care and the sensitivity of protected health information (PHI) related data. Past research 
provides some testimony that there is a relationship between organizations’ information 
assurance and their performance, such as reducing stock price (Campbell et al. 2003; Ettredge et 
al. 2003),  prohibitively high cost of a security breach (Sauer et al. 1997), and the effect of poor 
information assurance compliance on privacy and data protection (Culnan et al. 1999).  
Alternatively, information assurance can create positive organizational benefits 
(Ezingeard et al., (2005). For example, information assurance impacts the organization’s ability 
to deliver goods and services more effectively and also facilitates improvement in the quality, 
integrity, and availability of information. Past research suggests a link between employees' 
perceptions of information assurance and goal achievement through effective use of information 
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systems. That is, the more people perceive an organization’s information systems as highly 
assured, the greater the degree to which employees use the information systems effectively. 
In addition, employees who perceive that information assurance is high are more likely to 
believe that their organization is resilient and become more committed to the organization and 
their job with the organization. Eventually, the perception of high information assurance will 
motivate employees to increase their attitude toward using information systems despite problems 
thus improving organizational resilience. Thus, this study offers the following hypotheses in the 
context of a hospital environment: 
H3a: perceived information assurance will positively affect perceived organizational 
resilience. 
H3b: perceived information assurance will positively affect organization impact. 
H3c: perceived information assurance will positively affect individual impact. 
3.3 The Effect of Organizational Resilience 
At the individual level, employees’ perceived organizational resilience is defined as the 
belief that an organization has a relatively stable trait characterized by the ability to bounce back 
from negative experiences and by flexible adaptation to the emergency context.  
This study posits that, if employees believe that their organization is resilient enough to 
handle unexpected events, they will effectively use their systems regardless of the disaster and 
eventually their belief encourages them to enhance their work performance. Ezingeard et al. 
(2007) argued that resilience enables more consistent operational performance which, in turn, 
reduces costs and increases the ability to adapt quickly to changing external circumstances. Since 
organizational resilience becomes a motivational factor that directly mobilizes employees’ 
behaviors, organizational resilience affects individual performance using information systems by 
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helping people to create feelings of confidence in approaching difficult tasks and activities. Thus, 
individuals with a high perception of organizational resilience show a positive view of their 
organization, a sense of control over the organization, and an optimistic outlook on the future—
all resources should contribute to better adjustment to a disaster context. Specifically, given the 
external attribution of negative events described by Seligman (1998), when faced with negative 
outcomes, optimistic employees will likely attribute the failure to external causes, avoiding any 
sense of blame that may lead to deviant behavior. The lack of positive belief about an 
organization’s resilience tends to discourage employees, resulting in lower levels of performance 
on the job and the possibility of being less effective. Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize 
that organizational resilience is positively related to hospital information systems effectiveness:   
H4a: perceived organizational resilience will positively affect organizational impact.  
H4b: perceived organizational resilience will positively affect individual impact. 
Figure 1 captures the combined theoretical model and hypothesized relationships of this 



























Figure 2.  The Theoretical Model  
 
3.4 The Effect of Disasters 
People construct their own reality and evaluate risks according to their subjective 
perceptions. According to the availability heuristic, a cognitive strategy in which people rely 
upon knowledge that is readily available rather than examine other alternatives or procedures 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), people use the ease with which examples of a disaster can be 
recollected as a cue for estimating the probability of a hazard. As a result, experiences with a 
disaster should change the relationship between perceived risks, organizational resilience, and 
information assurance and information systems effectiveness from one before a disaster 
experience. We argue that an employee’s evaluation process appears differently depending on 
the experience of disasters.  
Prior studies show that past experience with disasters is an important factor in influencing 
people’s perceptions of hazards (See, Jackson, 1981). Specifically, Jackson (1981) found that 
experience after damaging earthquakes influenced the adoption of more frequent precautions. 
Stakeholders, therefore, would consider perceived risks, organizational resilience, and 
information assurance to make sure that their information systems work well in the disaster 
context. That is, these perceptions cause employees to become relatively more concerned that 
their information systems will not properly function and prevent them from completing the tasks 
that need to be discharged in a disaster context. This impedes employees from evaluating the 
effects of information assurance, organizational resilience, and perceived risks on information 
systems in a distinct way. It also deflates employees’ confidence in the effectiveness of 
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information systems with high-risk perception. Ultimately, employees will lean on their 
perception of risks and information assurance in gauging the hospital information system’s 
effectiveness. Therefore, hypothesis 5a is:  
H5a: The relationship between perceived risk and organizational impact will be stronger 
in the context of a disaster than outside of it. 
H5b: The relationship between perceived risk and individual impact will be stronger in the 
context of a disaster than outside of it.  
Paton et al. (2000) showed the relationship between disasters and resilience by exploring 
the effect of disaster experience on resilience. When employees experience a disaster, they 
elaborate whether their organization maintains business continuity (Waikar & Nichols, 1997). If 
employees conclude that their organization is resilient to operate well despite the disaster, 
compared to a pre-disaster context, these employees will focus more on their business 
continuity issues and are likely to have positive perceptions of their 
organizational ability to overcome disaster (Shen & Shaw, 2005). Hence, 
employees’ perceptions based on organization’s capability to secure 
information systems will help employees execute their charge in a better 
manner.  
Personal and organizational responses related to a disaster effect are predicated on 
consistent findings from protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975). According to the theory, 
people can be motivated to engage in desirable behaviors to avoid risks or fears from disasters. 
That is, when an individual faces a threat, he/she appraises the information available about the 
perceived severity of the threat and the perceived probability that the threat will occur. e/she 
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conducts the processes in selecting the perceived ability of a coping behavior to remove the 
threat and the individual's perceived ability to carry out the coping behavior (Rogers 1983).   
In the case of a disaster in an organizational context such as a hospital, the likelihood of 
employees undertaking psychological threat reduction behaviors can be increased by (1) the 
belief that their organization can still be secure in protecting their information systems from the 
disaster (i.e., information assurance), and (2) the belief that the organization would be able to 
mitigate the effect of the disaster (i.e., organizational resilience). This belief in the resilience of 
the organization leads the employees to avoid or reduce the psychological impact of the disaster. 
Employees who have experienced disasters would potentially exhibit greater levels of perceived 
organizational resilience in comparison to outside of the context of the disaster.  This leads to the 
following hypotheses:  
H6a: The relationship between perceived organizational resilience and organizational 
impact will be stronger in the context of a disaster than otherwise. 
H6b: The relationship between perceived organizational resilience and individual impact 
will be stronger in the context of a disaster than otherwise. 
H7a: The relationship between perceived information assurance and organizational impact 
will be stronger in the context of a disaster than otherwise. 
H7b: The relationship between perceived information assurance and individual impact will 
be stronger in the context of a disaster than otherwise. 














Figure 3. The Effect of a Disaster  
4. Methods 
4.1 Research Context 
This study examines the work-life factors affecting users of hospital information systems 
(HIS) rather than the technological factors such as information, systems, and service quality as is 
typically the case. Determining the extent to which a disaster changes the effect of work-life 
factors on HIS is performed by comparing the effectiveness of the systems before and after a 
disaster. In order to conduct this study, three hospitals affected by the debilitating October Snow 
storm of 2006 from the Western New York were selected. These three hospitals have similar 
hospital information system in terms of the basic functions performed. In addition, even though 
the three hospitals are different in size and type, the underlying security and privacy issues in 
using the HIS are similar. The hospitals are mandated to securely store health and administrative 
information in their HIS. Clinical hospital information systems provide online access to 
databases containing patients’ medical information for authorized main users (such as nurses, 
physicians, therapists, and lab technicians) to use in highly restricted ways. The system usage is 
predominantly dictated at the transaction level by the number of patients and the medical 
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procedures performed on them. This was not affected and therefore, system usage did not change 
during the storm because the patient inflow did not change.  
4.2 Item Development and Pilot Test 
While several items for constructs (i.e., organization and individual impact) were 
operationalized based on prior research, scale items for perceived risks, information assurance, 
and organizational resilience were newly developed in this study. At the outset, we developed an 
initial survey based on the literature. We interviewed IT executives from hospitals in the Buffalo 
area (including the Deputy Commissioner of Emergency Management at the county level, CIO 
and CSOs of the local hospitals, as well as the Director of Medical Emergency Services) in order 
to understand how stakeholders perceived their (organizational) ability to recover from disasters 
and factors that affects their risks and resilience. Since participants’ perceptions on those factors 
defer depending upon the usage of HIS, this study tried to include their various viewpoints by 
encouraging stakeholders to participate in this survey. This allowed us to deal with face validity 
for the construct components. Such an approach is consistent with Rousseau's original 
conceptualization (1989) of psychological contracts. 
A pilot study with 50 employees from one of three hospitals was conducted to validate 
the survey instrument and establish that the survey items portrayed their intended meaning. 
Feedback was also sought on the survey's length, its overall appearance, and participants' 
expected reaction to its receipt in the mail. Comments and suggestions from interviewees were 
used to revise the survey.   
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4.3 Participants  
A quasi-experimental field research, specifically a one-group pretest-posttest design 
(Cook et al. 1975) using surveys was conducted at three of the hospitals in the Buffalo area that 
were affected by a disaster referred to as the  October snow storm of October, 2006. This quasi-
experimental design was chosen to meet the criteria that the research should be based on the 
actual impact of disaster. Two hundred and fifty questionnaires were composed of repeated-
measure items and were distributed to the hospital employees. One hundred and eleven 
completed questionnaires were returned. These included hospital administrators, nurses, 
physicians, IT support staff, laboratory technicians, etc. These surveys included a treatment 
design with pretest, treatment presentation, and posttests. Of these, after removing surveys that 
had relatively high amounts of missing responses and/or surveys in which the same value was 
circled consecutively for every question, 104 surveys were considered usable, an effective 
response rate of 40.1%.  The sample was relatively small because all participants selected in this 
experiment were filtered at first step of experimental procedure that will be mentioned below. 
Since the employees’ disaster experience determines the success of the fundamental of this study, 
had to elaborately collect participants that made sample size small.  Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics relating to the responses.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N = 104) 
Contents Mean S.D. 
Total Years of Working 17.4 10.5 
Organization Tenure 11.99 10.23 
Year Using MIS 7.1 7.8 




















The users for hospital information systems can be categorized into two types of users: 
main users (i.e., physicians and nurses) vs. support users (i.e., hospital and IT supporters) 
depending on their usage of either clinical or administrative and support components of the 
system. There was no control group in this study. In order to identify the impact of disaster on 
the relationships among factors in our proposed model, we administered a treatment to the 
survey participants to facilitate the recall of their experiences during the October storm. The 
survey questionnaire consisted of three steps. First, participants were asked whether they worked 
in hospitals when the October storm was brought out. This question was intended to screen right 
subjects who meet our experiment. Since this study was mainly rely on their experience in terms 
of disaster and information systems in their organizations, subjects should have experience on 
working under the disaster context. In conducting a quasi-experimental design, our study was 
strictly applied to collect sample. This procedure allows us to achieve better research outcome in 
terms of the purposes of this study.  Therefore, this should not be a limitation on this study, 
although the study was performed with a small sample size, 
Second, participants were asked to answer the questions for all constructs without any 
cue regarding disasters. Second, a picture and news article along with five probing questions to 
serve as stimulus were presented to the same participants, to facilitate the recall of their 
experiences of the October storm. Third, after providing the treatment, the participants also were 
asked to answer the exact same questions. Since participants lived in the Buffalo area, they knew 
how the storm affected their everyday lives.  
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Stimulus Message: The experiment required each participant to read an enclosed news 
article (Figure 3) and a set of questions that was part of the survey. The message along with a 
picture (see Figure 3) was part of news article from New York Times story about the October 
storm. This news article was intended to recall only what happened at Buffalo area with the 
October storm. Thus, employees should clearly draw the memory about how the city was under 
the disaster. In addition, this message should not recollect employees’ memory related to them or 
their organizations including organizations’ information systems, their performance, or 
perceptions on information systems. Therefore, we believe that the message as a stimulus is not 
only simple and clear for the goal of the purpose of this study but this also would prevent 
employees from being directly affected by the message on two factors measuring IS 
effectiveness. 
Stimulus Check:  After the disaster recall stimulus, participants were asked to respond to two 
stimulus check questions: "Did the news article help in recalling details about the storm?” and 
"how much do you remember about the October storm in 2006?" The response for the second 
question was elicited as a score on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7= strongly 




Figure 4. Disaster Recall Stimulus  
4.5 Measures 
Information Systems Effectiveness: We used two factors to identify the impact of the 
disaster on information systems effectiveness in a hospital:  Individual Impact and 
Organizational Impact concepts (both derived from DeLone and McLean (1992)). For the 
‘individual impact factor’, we adapted and modified three items developed by DeLone and 
McLean (1992). We considered various aspects of an individual’s job related to their 
performance based on HIS. Employees in hospitals use HIS for their hospital related work in the 
provisioning of patient care. The sample list of items included are “The hospital information 
systems helps me meet patient needs effectively,” “The hospital information systems increases 
my productivity,” and “The hospital information systems saves my time.” The second measure 
of IS effectiveness, Organizational Impact, is a perceptual measure of the impact of an 
information system on the performance of the business. The underlying assumption is that an 
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information system is effective when it contributes to organizational effectiveness. DeLone and 
McLean (1992) suggest that organizational impact may be measured in terms of profit, sales 
revenue, staff productivity, competitive advantage, operations efficiency, and improved decision-
making (Thong et al. 1996b). Five items from Thong et al (1996b) were used to measure 
organizational impact in this study.  The sample list of items included are “the hospital 
information systems increase the effectiveness of our hospital’s operations and provide us with 
information to effectively manage medical supplies” and “the hospital information systems 
provides us with information to effectively manage medical supplies.” Measure items for both 
individual and organizational impacts are detailed as part of the appendix. 
Organizational Resilience: This is a new construct defined for the purposes of this study 
as the ability and capacity to withstand systemic discontinuities and adapt to it (Starr, Newfrock, 
& Delurey, 2003), as another dimension of information systems effectiveness. This construct 
was measured using four items. Sample items are: “Our organization has business continuity 
plans to handle unfamiliar situations” and “Our information systems recover quickly after critical 
incidents.” Respondents were asked to indicate their perception of the degree to which the 
organization’s information systems contributed to the organization’s impact in terms of staff 
productivity, operations efficiency, and improved decision-making using a 7-point Likert scale 
of agreement. 
Perceived Risks: We developed two dependency risk constructs: (a) an external risk 
construct measured using eight items and (b) an internal risk construct measured using three 
items. Sample items for external risk include: “Our hospital information systems might not 
operate, when the electric power system is disrupted”, “Our hospital information systems might 
not operate, when the gas and oil storage system is disrupted” etc. Sample item for internal risk 
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were: “When network facilities (e.g., network/cable plant) are disrupted the medical information 
systems are affected.” 
Information Assurance: Five items were used as a measure for the construct, perceived 
information assurance defined for the purposes of this study as the degree of perceived 
availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information systems. Those items were designed to 
cover both clinical and general (i.e., non clinical) information systems aspects. Items included 
were: “Medical information systems are accessible only to those authorized to have access” and 
“Our primary database system (i.e., medical records) is stable and safe against tampering.” 
Control Variable: The subjects of the survey were employees in three hospitals in the 
Buffalo area that were affected by the October Snow Storm. In order to find whether there were 
effects across organizations, organization was controlled. The three hospitals, from which data 
was collected for this study, are different in size and type. However they have similar hospital 
information system in terms of the basic functions they perform. To control for a possible 
organization type effect, we used categorical variables to assess consistency of results.  
4.6 Common Method Bias and Organizational Scale for Organization Level 
In order to address common method bias in our measures, we employed two statistical 
and procedural methodologies recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003) using Harman’s single 
factor test. According to the Harman’s test, common method bias is an issue if results from an 
exploratory factor analysis reveal that (1) a single factor emerges or (2) the first factor accounts 
for the majority of the covariance among the variables. Results from the Harman test suggested 
that common method bias was not a serious issue among these variables as more than one factor 
emerged from the un-rotated solution. All indicators showed high factor loadings and low cross-
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loadings. Each principal component explained almost an equal amount of the 74% total variance, 
ranging from 3.98% to 30.46%. This indicates that our data do not suffer from common method 
bias. The first factor accounted for only 30.46% of the variance and the second factor accounted 
for 14.16%.  
In order to further address method bias, another procedural remedy was introduced in the 
measurement of the variables as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003). First, as noted above, we 
reduced evaluation apprehension by providing respondents with verbal and written assurances of 
confidentiality by assuring them that there was no right or wrong answers, and requesting that 
they answer each question as honestly as possible. The latter procedures are known to reduce the 
likelihood of bias caused by social desirability or respondent acquiescence 
Employees provided ratings of both individual and organizational impact of the hospital’s 
information systems. Since the construct ‘organization impact’ is used as an organizational unit 
of analysis, there is the potential for common-method variance to inflate the associations 
between individual and organization impacts evaluated by the same employees. In order to 
ensure whether both concepts are the same unit of analysis, two tests were performed. First, we 
conducted within-group agreement (inter-rater reliability; Rwg
25) indexes26 (James et al. 1984) 
for the organizational impact scale. The rwg value has been employed to justify the 
appropriateness of aggregating data to higher levels of analysis.  For this analysis, all employees 
of three hospitals were included. Results showed that within-group variances are not 
                                                 
25 RWG(J) = {J[1- (mean of Sx2 /σE2)]} / {J[1- (mean of Sx2 /σE2)] + mean of Sx2 /σE2}, where J is the number of 
items rated, mean of Sx
2 is the observed item-wise variance across individuals, averaged over items, and σE
2 is the 
expected variance. 
26 An index of the observed variance divided by the expected variance due to random measurement errors, and 
indicates the extent of within-group agreement as opposed to reliability (Kozlowski et al. 1992). This reflects the 
perceptual congruence of a group of individuals who are assessing the same behavioral characteristic with respect to 
the target manager. 
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homogenous (Rwg= 0.35), which indicates that the concept of organization impact should not be 
aggregated to a higher level. Second, we used a Levene test for equality of variances (Levene 
1960) that indicates homogeneity of group variance to compare organizations. Results of this test 
were consistent with Rwg analysis, showing that within-group variances are not homogenous (F= 
5.100, p < 0.05). In sum, both analyses suggested that the concept, ‘organization impact’ in this 
study should be conceptualized at the individual-level. Based on the preceding results, the 
statistical analyses for hypotheses testing in relation to organization impact were conducted with 
104 individuals.     
4.7 Data Analyses  
Partial Least Squares (PLS), as implemented in PLS Graph version 3.0, was used for data 
analysis. The PLS approach allows researchers to assess measurement model parameters and 
structural path coefficients simultaneously (Barclay, Higgins, & Thompson, 1995). It focuses on 
a prediction-oriented and data-analytic method, seeking to maximize the variances that are 
explained in constructs (Barclay, et al., 1995). Several reasons motivate our using PLS in this 
study. First, this study was primarily intended for causal-predictive analysis, a condition for PLS 
suggested by Chin and Newsted (1999). Second, PLS requires fewer statistical specifications and 
constraints on the data than the covariance-based strategy of LISREL (e.g., assumptions of 
normality). Further, PLS was suitable for this study due to the small sample (N=104). 
Specifically, researchers often argue that PLS only requires a sample size of 10 times the most 
complex relationships within the research model (Barclay, et al., 1995). Third, PLS is effective 
for those early-theory testing situations that characterize this study.  
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Before testing the hypotheses in this study, preliminary analysis examined availability of 
pooled sample, and construct validity. Since the sample along user-type lines yielded a main 
(clinical) user group with 46 cases and a support user (administrative) group with 58 cases, the 
pooled data should be available to test hypothesis regardless of user-type. Table 2 reports the 
means and standard deviations for the subgroups and the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
tests for differences across the subgroups and the Levene’s test for homoscedasticity with SPSS. 
Both K-S test and Levene’s test show that there is no violation of the assumption that the two 
groups have approximately equal variance on the dependent variable (see Table 2).  
Table 2. Construct Characteristics and K-S Test Results by Subgroup 
Constructs Main user group Support user group 











F-Score Sig. Z- Score Sig. 
IM_M 4.61 1.48 4.88 1.75 1.81 0.18 0.991 0.279 
OM_M 4.13 1.57 4.33 1.64 0.12 0.73 0.752 0.624 
BBR_M 4.71 1.24 4.84 1.50 1.51 0.22 0.731 0.659 
FBR_M 5.02 1.13 5.12 1.42 1.71 0.19 1.012 0.257 
BSP 5.38 1.05 5.73 1.15 0.55 0.46 1.099 0.179 
FSP 5.62 0.96 5.80 1.15 1.61 0.21 1.037 0.233 
Note: ER: external risk, IR: internal risk, IM: impact on individual, OM: impact on 
organization, IA: information assurance, BBR: before resilience, FBR: after resilience, BPS: 
before information assurance, FSP: after information resilience 
5. Results 
5.1 Stimulus Check 
Overall, the results indicated that the stimulus worked as intended. To identify how much 
the stimulus affected the recall, we conducted the analysis of variance (ANOVA) using two 
questions: "Did the news article help in recalling details about the storm?” and "How much do 
you remember about the October storm in 2006?" The results indicated that the stimulus 
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significantly affected participants’ memory of the disaster (F= 5.452, p<0.001). Participants, 
who responded that the news article helped in recall, answered that they remembered the disaster 
clearly. 
Results of t-tests show the response differences in dependent constructs before- and after-
disaster. The results lend credence to the argument that the stimulus was successful (See Table 3). 
For all of the constructs, responses were scored higher after the disaster context than before: 
External perceived risk (t-value = 1.928, p < .05), internal perceived risk (t-value = 3.414, p 
< .001), organizational resilience (t-value = 3.488, p < .001), and information assurance (t-value 
= 2.614, p < .01).  
Table 3. The Result of T-Test (N = 104) 
Construct 
Mean 
Mean Difference t-value 
Before After 
External Perceived Risk 3.65 3.86 -.1993 -1.928* 
Internal Perceived Risk 4.64 4.96 -.3168 -3.414*** 
Resilience 4.83 5.09 -.2500 -3.488*** 
Information Assurance 5.56 5.71 -.1505 -2.614** 
 
5.2 Measurement Model Estimation 
The measurement model in PLS was assessed by examining internal consistency and 
convergent and discriminant validity (Barclay, et al., 1995; Wynne W. Chin, 1998). An internal 
consistency reliability of 0.7 or higher is considered adequate (Barclay, et al., 1995). Convergent 
and discriminant validity is assessed with the average variance extracted (AVE) for each 




Table 4. Inter-Construct Correlations  by Contexts 
Contexts and 
Construct 
Mean S.D. Correlations of Constructsa 
Pre treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 
$ER (1) 3.65 1.54 0.78           
IR (2) 4.64 1.34 0.38** 0.87         
Resilience (3) 4.73 1.61 -0.08 -0.13 0.73     
IA (4) 4.29 1.58 -0.3** -0.21* 0.3** 0.87   
IM (5) 4.83 1.35 -0.25* -0.23* 0.29** 0.26* 0.96   
OM (6) 5.56 1.09 -0.22* -0.33** 0.46** 0.36** 0.65** 0.82 
Post treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 
$ER (1) 3.86 1.59 0.79           
IR (2) 4.96 1.34 0.53** 0.86         
Resilience (3) 4.73 1.61 -0.19* -0.15 0.76     
IA (4) 4.29 1.58 -0.32** -0.31** 0.23* 0.87   
IM (5) 5.09 1.28 -0.26* -0.3** 0.25* 0.26* 0.96   
OM (6) 5.71 1.03 -0.34** -0.39** 0.39** 0.33** 0.74** 0.82 
Note: a Diagonal elements in the “correlation of constructs” matrix are the square root of 
the average variance extracted (AVE). For adequate discriminant validity, diagonal 
elements should be greater than corresponding off-diagonal elements. 
$ER: external risk, IR: internal risk, IM: impact on individual, OM: impact on 
organization, IA: information assurance 
**P < 0.01 (2-tailed), *P < 0.05 (2-tailed) 
Tables 4 and 5 show the scale means, standard deviations, Pearson’s correlations, 
composite reliability (C.R.), and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) among the measures, in two 
contexts: before and after the stimulus was administered. The composite scale reliability for each 
construct, which is similar to Cronbach’s alpha, were each above 0.80 (the recommended cut-off 
of 0.70), indicating that the measures used in this study are adequately reliable. Further, 
confirmatory factor analysis shows that each construct explains the variance equally. The 
aforementioned results suggest that the constructs in the study exhibit good psychometric 
properties. Factor loadings for the indicators associated with each construct are reported in Table 
5 and it shows that each of them exceed 0.70, indicating adequate reliability—the only exception 
being one item for the organizational impact construct.  
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Table 5. PLS Component-Based Analysis: Cross-Loadings 
Items 













































0.850 0.884 0.804 0.718 
0.859 
0.890 






0.946 0.972 0.958 0.922 
0.974 
0.961 










































0.902 0.940 0.920 0.758 
Note: To calculate cross loadings, a factor score for each construct was calculated based on the weighted sum, 
provided by PLS graph, of that factor’s standardized and normalized indicators. Factor scores were correlated with 
individual items to calculate cross loadings.  
Notes: ER: external risks, IR: internal risk, IM: individual impact, OM: organization impact, RES: Resilience, IA: 
information assurance 
                                                 
27 We included two items in organizational impact and perceived resilience, even though such items 
showed slightly lower factor loading scores than the recommended cut-off, .70 in further analyses. As 
Barclay et al. (1995) mentioned, some of the scales do not show the same psychometric properties when 
used in different theoretical and research contexts from those in which they were first developed. That is, 
it is important to retain as many items as possible from the original scale to preserve the integrity of the 
original research design, as well as the comparability of the results with other studies that used the same 
scales (Barclay, et al., 1995) , even though some of the factor loadings are slightly below than .70.  
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In any study, each construct is expected to share more variance with its items than with 
those of other constructs in the model in order to obtain convergent and discriminant validity. 
Convergent and discriminant validity is inferred when the square root for each construct’s AVE 
is larger than its correlations with other constructs (Wynne W. Chin, 1998). As shown in Table 4, 
the square root of AVE for every construct exceeded the suggested criterions of 0.70 for all 
measures (see the diagonal elements in the matrix; note that the AVE of each construct is higher 
than its correlations with other constructs). Therefore, adequate convergent and discriminant 
validity was obtained. 
5.3 Testing the Structural Model  
5.3.1 Testing the Significance of Path Coefficients 
PLS allows for testing of the structural model by evaluating path coefficients between 
latent constructs. Figure 4 presents the path coefficients for each of the sub-samples: before 
(pathb) and after (patha) the disasters contexts across each of the constructs. First, for the effect of 
external risk (H1), represented as path coefficients from external risk on internal risk are 
significant (pathb = 0.383; patha = 0.529); for Hypothesis H1a (external risk to information 
assurance: pathb = -0.169; patha = -0.221) and for Hypothesis H1b (internal risk to information 
assurance: pathb = -0.194; patha = -0.192) path coefficients are significant for both before and 
after the disaster context.  
Second, for the effect of internal risk on IS effectiveness (H2a&b), results show 
statistically significant paths from internal risk to organizational impact (pathb = -0.217; patha = -
0.174). On the other hand, the effects of internal risk on individual impact (pathb = -0.149; patha 
= -0.147) was not found to be significant. For the hypothesis H2b, i.e., effect of internal risk on 
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organizational resilience, there was no statistical significant at both contexts (pathb = -0.058; 


































(.161*)R2 = .136 (.091)
R2 = .280 (.146)
R2 = .405 (.406)
R2 = .088 (.113)
R2 = .221 (.229)Notes: Path coefficients for before disaster context in parenthesis.
Bold lines indicate significant paths at both contexts.










Figure 5. Results of Data Analysis: Pre and Post  
Third, the effects of employees’ perceptions of information assurance on IS effectiveness 
(Hypothesis H3a and H3b), path coefficients from information assurance to resilience (pathb = 
0.254; patha = 0.220) and to organizational impact (pathb = 0.188; patha = 0.194) and to  
individual impacts (pathb = 0.161; patha =0.166) were positive and statistically significant,. 
Finally, for the effect of organizational resilience on IS effectiveness (H4a&b), the effect 
of resilience on organizational impact (pathb = 0.217; patha = 0.262) was positively and 
statistically significant but for individual impact (pathb = 0.167; patha =0.058) did not show 
significant results. Table 5 shows the indirect effects of external (internal) risks through internal 
risk (information assurance) on information systems effectiveness. The external risks have 
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indirect effects on organization and individual impact, while internal risk only affects resilience 
through information assurance. 
5.3.2 Testing the Hypothesis of the Effect of Disaster 
Following the model tested, we conducted a multiple group analysis to find the 
differences in path coefficients for the before- and after- disaster effects. To test the effect of 
disaster, we estimated two separate models using before and after items in PLS. We then 
compared two models using the test for differences implemented by Keil et al. (2000) by 
calculating t-statistics to evaluate the differences in path coefficients across models. Unlike prior 
research, we used the same subject to compare two different contexts. The t-tests compare 
responses within participants.  
The results shown in Table 6 indicate that the differences between two path coefficients 
can be divided into two directions28, either positive or negative, based on the impact of the 
disaster: 1) the negative effects of external/internal perceived risk, and 2) the positive effects of 
information assurance and organizational resilience on three dimensions of information systems 
effectiveness.  
First, the negative effect of external risks on internal risks and information assurance were 
significantly stronger after the disaster than the corresponding effect in the structure model for 
the pre-disaster context (T-value= -12.739 and -3.200). For the hypothesis 5, the effect of 
internal perceived risk was statistically significant results for organizational impacts and 
                                                 
28 2 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2
[(N -1) /(N + N +2)] SE +[(N -1) / (N + N +2)] SE= × ×Spooled , 
1 2 1 2
(PC  - PC ) / [Spooled  (1/N  + 1/N ) ]= ×t , where, spooled 
indicates pooled estimator for the variance, Ni is sample size of dataset of group i, SEi is standard error of path in 




organizational resilience (T-value= -3.133 and -1.866) (H5a) but for the information assurance 
and individual impact, there were no significant differences (H5b).   
Second, the positive effects of organizational resilience and information assurance on 
individual and organization impact were found to be higher after the disaster context than before 
the disaster context.  For the hypothesis 6, organizational resilience was significantly stronger for 
organization impact after the disaster context as compared to the before disaster context (T-
value= 2.869) (H6a) but was not significant for individual impact (H6b).  
Finally, the effect of information assurance did not show statistical significance for both 
organizational (H7a) and individual impact (H7b) but organizational resilience in the before 
disaster context than in the after disaster context (T-value= 2.146).  The discussion section will 
address the implications of the results. 
Table 6. Difference Between Before And After the Disaster 
Path Before After A vs. B 
Direct Effect S.D Path T S.D Path T $P. Diff. T-value 
ER → IR 0.089 0.383 4.267 0.074 0.529 7.605 0.146 12.739***  
ER → IA 0.119 -0.169 ns 0.113 -0.221 2.383 0.052 3.200***  
IR → IA 0.106 -0.194 1.656 0.102 -0.192 2.422 -0.002 ns 
IR → IM 0.115 -0.149 ns 0.109 -0.147 ns ns ns 
RES → IM 0.125 0.166 ns 0.099 0.148 ns ns ns 
IA → IM 0.126 0.161 1.946 0.117 0.166 2.163 ns ns 
IR → OM 0.098 -0.217 2.030 0.098 -0.174 1.631 -0.043 -3.133*** 
RES→ OM 0.126 0.217 1.884 0.096 0.262 2.815 0.045 -2.869** 
IA → OM 0.165 0.188 2.331 0.118 0.194 2.525 ns ns 
IR → RES 0.136 -0.058 ns 0.124 -0.024 ns ns ns 
IA → RES 0.107 0.254 2.112 0.119 0.220 1.907 -0.034 2.146* 
Indirect Effect S.E%  Z stat S.E%  Z stat   
ER→IR→ OM 0.043 -0.090 -2.07 0.059 -0.151 -2.571 0.061 8.397*** 
ER→IR → IM 0.047 -0.063 ns 0.062 -0.122 -1.958 0.059 7.621***   
ER→IR → RES 0.053 -0.027 ns 0.067 -0.046 ns ns ns 
IR→IA → OM 0.030 -0.024 ns 0.031 -0.033 ns ns ns 
IR→IA → IM 0.023 -0.018 ns 0.047 -0.029 ns ns ns 
IR→IA → RES 0.030 -0.033 ns 0.033 -0.040 ns ns ns 








2), where a and b and are the magnitudes of the paths between x, M, and y, and sa 
and sb are the standard deviations of a and b. 
$ P. Diff.: Differences of path coefficients between before and after the disaster. Negative sign indicates that 
the path coefficient of Before the disaster is bigger than one of After the disaster. 
P* < 0.05, P** <0.01, P*** <0.001 
 
5.4 Post Hoc Analysis 
We tested the impact of a possible explanatory factor: usage of different groups. This 
post-hoc analysis relates to the differential effect of both organizational resilience and 
information assurance on hospital information systems effectiveness between main (clinical) user 
and support (administrative) user. We analyzed the different effect on HIS based on user types. 
As we mentioned in methods section, HIS users can be categorized into two major users: main 
users who are consumers of the information system, such as physicians and nurses vs. support 
users who are suppliers, such as hospital and IT supporters and they have different purposes to 
use the systems. As consumers, main-users are deeply involved in using systems applications 
(i.e., software applications, database software etc) that typically relate to EMR. On the other 
hand, support-user focuses more on the technical and system hardware and billing/scheduling 
systems. Therefore, the effect of disaster on their hospital information system can be different 
between these two user groups. Specifically, users’ position can moderate the effect of two 
factors on the relationship between risk, resilience, and information assurance and those 
consequences (IM and OM). Since the purpose of the use for hospital information systems is 
different between main users who involve in data and information relating to the provisioning of  
care for patients and supporters who focus on keeping the systems constantly available. For 
example, comparably stressful perception (i.e., perceived risk) can have more serious influence 
on main users such as physician and nurse than on administrators such as IT supporters. 
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Perceived risk has a stronger negative impact on the nurses or physician’s use of hospital 
information systems than administrators do.  
The results of differences between two path coefficients across the before- and after- 
disaster context are shown in Table 7 and 8. First, the tables showed that internal risk affected 
individual impact (IR  IM), which was not significant for the whole model, for main user both 
before (b = -.273, p < 0.01) and after disaster (b = -.266, p < 0.01). However, the table reveals 
insignificant results not only for the effect of internal risk on information assurance (b = -.146 
and , p > 0.05) and resilience on organizational impact (b = -.204, p > 0.05) for before disaster 
but also the effect of external risks on information assurance (b = .139 and , p > 0.05), resilience 
on organizational impact (b = .253 and , p > 0.05), and information assurance on organizational 
impact (b = -.149 and , p > 0.05) for after disaster.   
Second, for the support user, Table 7 and 8 showed significant results on the effect of 
external risk on information assurance before disaster (b = -.300 and , p < 0.01) and the effect of 
information assurance on individual impact after disaster (b = -.219 and , p < 0.05) (both results 
were not significant in whole model).  
Finally, for the difference between two users, results showed consistent direction for 
information assurance and internal risk. Support user has higher impact from the paths in terms 
of information assurance than main users do (i.e. ER → IA, IA → IM, and IA → OM). Main user, 
however, has higher impact from the paths in terms of internal risk than support user do (i.e., ER 
→ IR, IR → IM, IR → OM, and IR → RES).   
 
Table 7. Difference between  main and support users for before disaster 
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Path Main user (n=46) Support user (n=58) A vs. B 
Direct Effect S.D Path T S.D Path T $P. Diff. T-value 
ER  IR 0.143 0.448 1.861* 0.153 0.315 2.067* 0.133 4.531***  
ER  IA 0.261 -0.037 ns 0.154 -0.300 2.300** -0.263 6.401***  
IR  IA 0.190 -0.146 ns 0.133 -0.169 ns ns ns 
IR  IM 0.116 -0.273 2.627** 0.157 -0.086 ns 0.187 6.746*** 
RES  IM 0.127 0.146 ns 0.162 0.134 ns ns ns 
IA  IM 0.135 0.126 ns 0.137 0.190 ns ns ns 
IR  OM 0.094 -0.430 4.367*** 0.152 -0.094 ns 0.336 13.126***  
RES OM 0.102 0.204 ns 0.136 0.127 ns ns ns 
IA  OM 0.106 0.204 2.121* 0.136 0.251 2.023* -0.047 1.925*  
IR  RES 0.163 -0.141 ns 0.197 -0.056 ns ns ns 
IA  RES 0.110 0.465 3.803*** 0.215 0.196 ns 0.269 7.717***  
control  IM 0.101 -0.207 1.784* 0.083 -0.355 4.702*** -0.148 8.203***  
control OM 0.091 -0.265 2.705** 0.069 -0.523 8.107*** -0.258 16.445***  
control RES 0.135 -0.124 ns 0.128 -0.253 1.981* -0.129 4.983**  
 
Table 8. Difference between  main and support users for after disaster 
Path Main user (n=46) Support user (n=58) A vs. B 
Direct Effect S.D Path T S.D Path T $P. Diff. T-value 
ER  IR 0.100 0.663 6.612*** 0.126 0.423 3.343*** 0.24 10.547***  
ER  IA 0.130 0.139 ns 0.099 -0.428 4.904*** -0.567 25.253***  
IR  IA 0.208 -0.368 1.769* 0.106 -0.132 ns 0.236 7.505***  
IR  IM 0.147 -0.266 2.355** 0.157 -0.033 ns 0.233 7.730***  
RES  IM 0.188 0.128 ns 0.156 0.149 ns ns ns 
IA  IM 0.144 0.115 ns 0.149 0.219 ns ns ns 
IR  OM 0.136 -0.315 3.263*** 0.133 -0.058 ns 0.257 9.690***  
RES OM 0.198 0.253 ns 0.120 0.237 1.969* 0.016 ns 
IA  OM 0.175 0.149 ns 0.140 0.267 2.173* -0.118 3.821*  
IR  RES 0.227 -0.177 ns 0.199 0.058 ns ns ns 
IA  RES 0.147 0.328 2.227** 0.179 0.156 ns 0.172 5.259***  
control  IM 0.164 -0.153 ns 0.114 -0.324 3.127*** -0.171 6.262***  
control  OM 0.133 -0.223 1.677* 0.084 -0.460 6.128*** -0.237 11.075***  
control  RES 0.229 -0.001 ns 0.106 -0.227 2.134* -0.226 6.674***  
Notes: P* < 0.05, P** <0.01, P*** <0.001 
6. Discussion  
In this study, we explored how external perceived risks affect information systems’ 
effectiveness through perceived internal risk and information assurance and the impact of 
disaster on the relationship between the two. The study also addressed the issue of whether 
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organizational resilience positively affected information systems effectiveness. Table 9 
presents a summary of the results and shows that data from the hospitals 
supported nine of the fourteen proposed hypotheses. 
Table 9. Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypothesis Descriptions Support 
H1a External risk is positively related to internal risk.  Yes 
H1b External risk is negatively related to information assurance. Yes 
H2a Internal risk is negatively related to information assurance. Yes 
H2b Internal risk is negatively related to organizational resilience. No 
H2c Internal risk is negatively related to organization impact. Yes 
H2d Internal risk is negatively related to individual impact. No 
H3a 
Information assurance will positively affect organizational 
resilience. 
Yes 
H3b Information assurance will positively affect organization impact. Yes 
H3c Information assurance will positively affect individual impact. Yes 
H4a 
Organizational Resilience will positively affect organization 
impact. 
Yes 





Risks will differently affect organizational impact depending on the 
presence or absence of a disaster.  
Yes  
H5b 
Risks will differently affect individual impact depending on the 
presence or absence of a disaster. 
No 
H6a 
Organizational Resilience will affect organizational impact 
differently depending on the presence or absence of a disaster.  
Yes  
H6b 
Organizational Resilience will affect individual impact differently 
depending on the presence or absence of a disaster. 
No 
H7a 
Information assurance will affect organizational impact differently 
depending on the presence or absence of a disaster.   
No 
H7b 
Information assurance will affect individual impact differently 
depending on the presence or absence of a disaster.   
No 
Thus, the overarching conclusion is that a disaster experience affects hospital employees’ 
perceptions about information systems in important ways. Specifically, organizational resilience 
has relatively higher effect on information systems effectiveness in the context of a disaster, 
106 
 
while internal perceived risk has more effect on information systems effectiveness before the 
disaster. We also conclude that internal perceived risk negatively affects ‘organizational impact’ 
both before and after the disaster context. Finally, our results also yielded no support for the 
hypothesis (H2b) relating internal risk and organizational resilience, a surprising and interesting 
conclusion. 
6.1 Theoretical Implications 
This research contributes to the body of literature on extreme events. It informs both 
research and practice. Our work contributes in several ways. First, the major contribution of this 
research is that it empirically provides a psychological mechanism on perceived risks, perceived 
information assurance, and organizational resilience for the usage of information systems under 
the disaster. According to the information systems literature, such psychological aspects in 
linking risks and organizational resilience have not been empirically investigated. Distinguishing 
between external and internal perceived risks caused by disaster enhances our understanding of 
how people are influenced by external risks. Even though external perceived risk itself does not 
affect the information systems effectiveness and resilience, it triggered employees in their 
perceptions regarding internal risk and information assurance in their organization. This finding 
calls for future research on identifying and integrating additional factors to extend the impacts of 
resilience and information assurance on information systems effectiveness.  
Second, our research sheds light on the way in which a disaster affects the relationship 
between employees’ perceptions and information systems’ effectiveness. We show how various 
individual perceptions differently affect information systems effectiveness in the disaster context 
by focusing on system users’ cognitive elements, such as perceived risks, information assurance, 
107 
 
and organizational resilience. Specifically, this study shows that a disaster could increase the 
effect of perceived risks, while decreasing the effect of resilience on information systems 
effectiveness, which in turn indicates negative effects on information systems effectiveness. We 
explored employees’ perceptions about risks and resilience as two major potential factors of 
enhancing information systems effectiveness, which helps us to answer, in part, how a disaster 
affects individuals and what factors can explain the way that disaster affects information 
systems’ effectiveness.   
  Third, this study integrated effects of risks and resilience, which are often described as 
different sides of the same coin (Haeffel et al. 2007), by considering factors affecting 
organizational performance (i.e. hospital information systems effectiveness) in the model. Past 
research shows that risk and resilience are both affected by disasters (see, Paton et al. 2000). To 
date however, the relationship between perceived risk and resilience and the effect on the 
organizational performance and information systems effectiveness has not been studied. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study of its kind and the related issues need further flushing by way of 
further research in this area. The study informs us that the effect of resilience on information 
systems effectiveness was higher in the context of the disaster than before the disaster experience, 
while perceived internal risk more affects hospital information systems effectiveness before the 
disaster. When individuals deal with extreme events, they tend to lean more heavily on positive 
beliefs (i.e., resilience) than negative beliefs (perceived risk). In the context of the disaster, 
however, a disaster experience relieves perceived risk and in turn, the relieved perceived risk 
reduces the effect of IT on organizational impact. On the other hand, the experience fortifies the 
perceived resilience to keep their business continuity being stable and thus, the resilience 
reinforces employees to enhance organizational impact. Drawing on information systems success 
108 
 
theory and resilience theory, we provide an explanation for how the use of perceived risks and 
resilience correspondingly affect organizational performance. The empirical results suggest that 
these two factors are critical for the information systems effectiveness in disaster contexts. 
6.2 Practical Implications  
Many companies encourage their employees to believe that their organization maintains 
business continuity plans so as to reduce perceptions about their organizational risks and to 
improve their firms’ performance through organizational resilience. Many of them will have 
plans, but the details of the plans may not be widely known to employees, except to the disaster 
response teams. Preparing for extreme events and training employees to manage, helps 
employees cope better with stressors that are a consequence of extreme events, and would 
positively affect organizations in terms of better business continuity and information system 
effectiveness. On the other hand, negative extreme events result in physical and psychological 
impacts that lead to elevated stress levels and higher perceived risk, and this in turn generates a 
negative image. Proper coping strategies need to be developed and employees should be made to 
participate in them. The findings suggest that the employees’ perceptions of risks and 
information assurance are important not only to maintaining resilience and hospital information 
systems effectiveness but also to facilitating employees’ work using hospital information 
systems. Managers should focus on employees’ work practices by enhancing their capabilities to 
handle emergency contexts and to maintain better business continuity during and in the aftermath 
of extreme events.  
In order for hospitals to increase information systems effectiveness, hospitals may pursue 
two strategies in terms of risk and resilience in a disaster context: (a) increasing organizational 
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resilience and/or (b) decreasing internal risk perception. Even though internal risk perception is 
decreased, organizational resilience may not improve. Hospital management should adopt a 
process to enhance resilience and a separate process to reduce perceived internal risk. Since 
disasters expose employees to tasks that are physically and psychologically complex, ambiguous 
and difficult to assimilate(Hahn et al. 2010; Paton et al. 2001), the perception of organizational 
resilience—the perceptions that systems are powerful, resourceful, and capable of dealing with 
all the demands employees may face—makes employees more effectively use hospital 
information systems to enhance their performance and to overcome the disaster.  
In order to enhance employees’ perception of organizational resilience, hospital managers 
can increase their organization’s information assurance, such as improving security and privacy 
practices instead of decreasing risk perception. Information assurance in and of itself influences 
improvement in IS effectiveness. As the results show, information assurance increases 
organizational resilience which is consistent with Ezingeard et al.’s (2007) suggestion that 
information assurance is an important function within organizations, a factor as critical to 
organizational success. Information assurance can also be enhanced by educating and informing 
employees as it increases the probability of a high degree of security and privacy perceptions 
among employees.  
Finally, the findings suggest that when individuals deal with extreme events, they tend to 
lean more on  a positive belief (i.e., resilience) than a negative belief (perceived risk) in the 
context of an  of organization. The experience of disaster reduces the effects of perceived risk. 
After an actual disaster, however, the disaster experience decreases perceived risk, and that in 
turn reduces the effect of it on ‘organizational impact’. In addition, a disaster experience may 
ameliorate the positive effects of information assurance on organizational resilience and the 
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effect of organizational resilience on IS effectiveness. The experience fortifies the perceived 
resilience to keep their business continuity being stable and thus, the resilience reinforces them 
to enhance organizational impact. 
6.3 Implications for Practitioners 
In keeping their business continuity, Managers may undertake two different strategies for 
different users of the information systems. First, pre- and post-disaster strategy: Managers want 
to keep their businesses continuing under any given circumstance. However, results revealed that 
individuals were affected workplace environment under the different context i.e., extreme event. 
In terms of the work environment, this research has important implications for job design and 
management of IT enabled work environments in continuing their business. If managers want to 
alleviate such differences in employees’ behavior between different contexts, they need to 
establish emergency response policies including preparedness and risk management to guide 
employees on how to deal with extreme events and when continue working on their tasks with 
effectively using hospital information systems for success. A core objective of emergency 
response is facilitating the capacity of individuals and communities to maintain or regain prior 
levels of functioning following significant disruption by extreme event activity (Paton, Kelly, 
Burgelt, & Doherty, 2006). In addition, organizational preparedness can reduces the risk of 
damage within a organization and facilitates a capability for coping with the temporary 
disruption related to extreme event. Therefore, the maintenance of preparedness over time is 
essential to sustaining individual resilience (Paton, et al., 2000). By doing so, when perceptions 
of risk or information assurance caused by the extreme events inhibit the employees’ resilience 
and effective utilization of information systems, perhaps employees’ disaster preparedness can 
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be increased and thus, their usage of information systems can be enhanced. Through careful 
management of the change of work environment, we can influence whether and how employees 
try to keep their works consistent. While it may appear intuitively clear that these are things a 
good managers should do anyway, our study provides empirical evidence that should provide a 
guideline for managers to control information systems.  
Second, A strategy for different users: Although exploratory, this study’s findings suggest 
IT-related goals of different user groups may be influenced by different aspects of information 
systems. In particular, managers need to take into account such different types of users and 
circumstances when dealing with hospital information systems. Results show that the different 
effect on HIS based on user types which have different purposes to use the systems. According 
to results, main users, who are physicians and nurses as consumers using the information system 
for clinical purpose, are more concerns about the effect of internal risk on their effective use of 
information systems regardless of disaster, while support users, who are IT technologists and 
administrators as suppliers to keep the information systems sustaining, tended to focus more on 
information assurance such as security and privacy concerns and external perceived risk. This is 
because they use the information systems with different purposes; the main-users are deeply 
involved in using systems applications (i.e., software applications, database software etc) that 
typically relate to patients care and these might be detrimentally affected by the inoperable 
systems caused by extreme events.  On the other hand, support-user are more concerned about 
not only keeping technical/system hardware and billing/scheduling systems safe but also 
preventing their patients records from threats. To enhance the applicability of main users and IT 
support users’ use of information systems, management should provide employees with 
information on security and privacy policies with strong system security/privacy protection 
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programs. In addition, managers need to ensure they behave and structure solid hospital 
information systems such that employees believe not only that the systems are not vulnerable to 
physical or technical threats but also that they are capable of controlling information systems for 
their tasks under any circumstances. Consistent with the institutional efforts for enhancing 
hospital employees’ perceived organizational resilience and reducing information assurance on 
hospitals’ information systems, top management should clearly advertise the point that the 
organization cares about the robustness of hospital information systems and that this is an 
important mission of the organization. 
6.4 Limitations and Future Research 
Future research could strengthen and extend the results of this study by addressing the 
limitations. First, the research design in this study has limited internal validity due to the lack of 
a control group (i.e., employees were not randomly assigned to conditions in general).  
Second, this study excluded several important factors regarding IS effectiveness, such as 
information quality, systems quality, and user satisfaction. Even though this study mainly 
focused on the factors relating to disasters, those measures may help refine the results in the 
model and allow us to better understand the phenomenon. Despite such limitations, this study 
represents an initial step in developing a better understanding of perceived risks, resilience, and 
information assurance regarding information effectiveness, and it provides feasible suggestions 
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The three essays in this dissertation cover important areas of the technical and behavioral 
aspects of information assurance including security and privacy. Information assurance (IA) is a 
topic of growing interest to many organizations in terms of their organizational and individual 
performances using information systems and technology.  
The three essays presented in the previous chapters of this dissertation explain various 
and independent but inter‐related aspects regarding the information systems environment 
surrounding information systems users. Consequently, combined together, the findings of these 
essays offer more insightful information and provide stronger implications. 
The three essays in this dissertation span across themes, dealing with various topics in the 
contemporary technological and psychological research issues, such as malware protection, 
privacy concerns in online mail usage, and impact of extreme event on performances in 
organizations regarding information systems. It is important to note that the three essays 
presented an important contribution to the information systems research community by shedding 
light on scientific knowledge in this field and provide practical implications for managers 
improve effectiveness of information systems in their organizations. This research has 
implications for practice and has been well received by not only the peers in the field, but also by 
practitioners. The studies considered in this dissertation present big picture covering not only 
technical aspect which is able to build systems security but also individual usage of the systems 
and organizational policy on usage of information systems under the extreme event.  
There are quite a few directions along which the research reported in these three essays 
can be extended. The findings of these studies as well as limitations of these studies provide 
opportunities for further exploration in information systems area. First essay in this dissertation 
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considered the categorizing framework with simple criteria as technical method. It is possible to 
draw other tradeoffs in terms of the number of clusters that could conceivably be created. In 
categorizing the malware, further research would be valuable to develop an economics analysis 
taking into account their detrimental impact and the cost relating office-disruption, etc. is a 
potential area for future exploration. Second essay suggests researchers to examine and amplify 
the potentially influential role of privacy and of users’ behavior with in other vulnerable online 
contexts. 
Third essay used sample collected at specific area: Western New York. Unfortunately, 
however, Mother Nature does not unfair to take a mercy on earth. Any area and organizations 
could be target of extreme events. This study was just beginning to scratch their surfaces. This 
study recommends researchers extend with larger and wider ranges of samples from different 
countries. In addition, future research should consider a variety of individual and organizational 
factors in looking for critical impacts on individual and organization performances using 
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